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MANDATED DISCLOSURE IN LITERARY HYBRID
SPEECH
Zahr K. Said
Abstract: This Article, written for the Washington Law Review’s 2013 Symposium, The
Disclosure Crisis, argues that hidden sponsorship creates a form of non-actionable influence
rather than causing legally cognizable deception that mandatory disclosure can and should
cure. The Article identifies and calls into question three widely held assumptions
underpinning much of the regulation of embedded advertising, or hidden sponsorship, in
artistic communications. The first assumption is that advertising can be meaningfully
discerned and separated from communicative content for the purposes of mandating
disclosure, even when such advertising occurs in “hybrid speech.” The second assumption is
that the hidden promotional aspects of hybrid speech create a form of legally cognizable
deception. The final assumption holds that disclosure is normatively desirable, to inform
audiences of hybrid speech of its hybridity, and in so doing, to remedy the perceived harms
that flow from hidden sponsorship. The Article challenges these three assumptions by using
as an example the little-remarked phenomenon of sponsored literature, literary texts in and
around which advertising is inserted, as well as literary texts that owe their existence to
commissioning advertisers. The standard disclosure literature does not consider contexts such
as these, in which the decision-making process does not involve crucial questions of life or
death, shelter or homelessness, solvency or bankruptcy. Thus the entertainment context of
hybrid speech demands different regulatory treatment. The Article concludes that mandatory
disclosure is the wrong regulatory response to hidden sponsorship because the harms that it
ostensibly creates are rooted in influence, rather than deception.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article, written for the Washington Law Review’s 2013
Symposium, The Disclosure Crisis, argues that hidden sponsorship
creates a form of non-actionable influence rather than causing legally
cognizable deception that mandatory disclosure can and should cure.
The Article identifies and calls into question three widely held
assumptions underpinning much regulation of embedded advertising. In
particular, it takes aim at the central mechanism by which such
regulation seeks to remedy any harms perceived to emanate from hidden
sponsorship: disclosure. It challenges these three assumptions by using a
previously unexamined terrain for sponsorship: literature. Sponsored
literature consists of literary texts in and around which advertising is
inserted, as well as literary texts that owe their existence to
commissioning advertisers.
The Article applies these three central assumptions to sponsored
literature and concludes that collectively, these assumptions should be
revisited and either abandoned, or more thoroughly theorized and
justified. At present, these assumptions are naïve, mistaken, or otherwise
indefensible. In turn, undermining these assumptions weakens the case
on behalf of mandated disclosure for the influence ostensibly exerted by
embedded advertising, or the insertion of promotional products or
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messages in artistic content.1
The first assumption is that advertising can be meaningfully discerned
and separated from communicative content for the purposes of
mandating disclosure, even when advertising occurs in expressive or
artistic content; that is, even when it occurs in what we could call
“hybrid speech.”2 Hybrid speech refers to collaboration between
advertisers and content producers in the creation of content that is
functionally a hybrid of promotional and artistic messages.3 The second
assumption, which builds on the first, is that the hidden promotional
aspects of hybrid speech create a form of legally cognizable deception.
The final assumption also builds on the first, and it reflects a long history
of regulatory and legislative action. It relies on the notion that disclosure
is normatively desirable in that it informs audiences of hybrid speech of
its hybridity and it delineates the respective contributions from both
content creators and sponsors. In so doing, disclosure is thought to
remedy the perceived harms that flow from hidden sponsorship.
Accordingly, the Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a
background in sponsored forms of communicative content, arguing that
hybrid speech is common, and likely to continue to increase, in film,
television, internet content, and even literature. It emphasizes literature
as a special case because currently there is no disclosure regime
applicable to most forms of literature. Furthermore, no scholarship has
focused on sponsored literature yet. Finally, this scholarship is timely
because sponsored literature, in one form or another, is likely to become

1. See Zahr Said, Embedded Advertising and the Venture Consumer, 89 N.C. L. REV. 99, 107
(2010).
2. Other terms include “embedded advertising” (the FCC); “stealth marketing” (Ellen Goodman);
“camouflaged promotion” (Nat Stern); and “advertainment” (numerous others). See, e.g.,
Sponsorship Identification Rules and Embedded Advertising, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,194 (July 24, 2008);
Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 109 (2006); Nat
Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 125
(1999); Benjamin R. Mulcahy, That’s Advertainment!, 29 L.A. LAW. 44, 44 (2006), available at
http://www.sheppardmullin.com/assets/attachments/310.PDF; John P. Feldman & Gonzalo E. Mon,
“Advertainment” and “Advergaming”: Legal Considerations Concerning a New Trend in Online
Advertising, 3 No. 11 E-COMMERCE L. REP. 2 (Sept. 2001) (“Advertainment is any mode of
entertainment (film, music, dramatics) that purports to be presented for entertainment value but is
produced by a company primarily to feature its products or services.”).
3. See Mulcahy, supra note 2 (describing the emergence of branded entertainment and the reasons
for its growth); see also Siva K. Balasubramanian, Beyond Advertising and Publicity: Hybrid
Messages and Public Policy Issues, 23 J. OF ADVERTISING 29, 30 (1994); Note, Making Sense of
Hybrid Speech: A New Model for Commercial Speech and Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2836, 2837 (2005) (defining hybrid speech as speech or expressive conduct that contains “a
different mixture of protected elements that merit a heightened level of First Amendment scrutiny
and of regulable elements that deserve only rational basis review”).
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more and more common.4 Part II tackles the question of whether
advertising content can truly be parsed and differentiated from creative
content such that one can satisfactorily be called “art” and the other
“commerce” for the purposes of mandating disclosure as to art’s origins.
Discerning who contributed what to a work of art, and why, is a
notoriously difficult endeavor. However, sponsorship endorsement law
seems to presume its feasibility. Part II then suggests, through reference
to sponsored literary texts, that such a division is often unrealistic and
potentially unreliable.
Part III argues that, to the extent that hidden forms of sponsorship
permeate expressive content, their presence constitutes a form of
influence over audiences rather than a form of deception. Because
influence is different from deception, the law should not treat it the way
it treats traditional forms of deception. This Part draws on Gregory
Klass’s taxonomy of regulatory approaches to deception to conclude that
a causal-predictive model of deception might encompass the harm of
“influence” through hidden sponsorship. Part IV queries whether
disclosure is a tool that effectively addresses the concerns that hybrid
speech raises for consumers, focusing on the question of sponsored
literature. It relies upon the groundbreaking work of Carl Schneider and
Omri Ben-Shahar to conclude that disclosure is not effective in this
manner because it is incapable of providing readers with the information
they would—or perhaps should—desire in order to make decisions about
their entertainment content. On the contrary, disclosures in literary
hybrid speech would likely only impose on readers by diminishing their
immersion in the entertainment content and by burdening them with
intrusive and potentially voluminous information that does not
materially affect their decisions.
To some extent, consumer preferences in this context are unknown.
Consumers might indicate that they would welcome more information in
the form of disclosures, but their preferences might change if such
information were presented in an interruptive fashion. If consumers had
to make choices between more information (and less immersion), or less
information (and more immersion), it is unknown which they would
choose. Put another way, it is unclear whether consumers would prefer
to sacrifice immersion or information provided by disclosure if they
were unable to have what they considered an optimal balance of both. It
is also unknown whether, if regulatory limitations on sponsor

4. See Ron Adner & William Vincent, Get Ready for Ads in E-Books, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19,
2012, at A17.
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participation decreased the available amounts or forms of content,
consumers would believe themselves better or worse off.
Yet there is also a normative question apart from the empirical ones:
does embedded advertising produce the sort of harm that justifies
mandating disclosure, even if it intrudes on artistic creation and audience
consumption? Assuming arguendo that it does, the Article examines
whether disclosure is the proper remedy for embedded advertising’s
perceived harms, and concludes that it is not. Disclosing sponsor
involvement does not disclose the information that consumers really
do—or, more normatively, should—care about: creative autonomy with
respect to issues and products featured in an artistic text and capable of
influencing consumers. In light of the foregoing, the Article concludes
that the three main assumptions underpinning the traditional view of
disclosure’s role in curbing hidden influences require revision and,
possibly, concomitant regulatory reaction. Reviewing these assumptions
helps make the case that mandatory disclosure is the wrong regulatory
response to hidden sponsorship because disclosure is a remedy designed
to provide information and prevent deception. Yet the harms that
sponsorship ostensibly creates are rooted in influence, rather than
deception. Most sponsorship falls well below the threshold required for
deception claims, and although some sui generis sponsorship laws exist,
they often do not reach all forms of sponsorship. Accordingly, a theory
of some alternative sort of harm created by sponsorship could free
regulators to rethink the goals and mechanisms of their regulation of
these marketing practices.
I.

BACKGROUND: THE EXISTENCE OF HYBRID SPEECH IS
WIDESPREAD

Hybrid speech, or expressive content that integrates both editorial and
commercial messages, is everywhere. This section provides the reader
with a background in sponsored forms of communicative content. It
shows that hybrid speech is common, familiar, and likely to continue to
increase across many media: film, television, internet content, and
literature. Hybrid speech plays a new and evolving role in social media
as well, where its status changes constantly as a function of
technological developments, advertiser pressures, consumer responses,
and regulatory and legal challenges.5
This Part places special emphasis on literature as a uniquely

5. See Said, supra note 1, at 109–16.
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compelling arena to investigate because no disclosure regime yet applies
to literature (unless literary texts take the form of sponsored blogs, at
which point they would fall into a clearly enumerated category targeted
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)). Moreover, knowledge of
literary sponsorship is not widespread in the way that it is with respect to
audiovisual sponsorship, where its prevalence is by now familiar to
many.6 Accordingly, Section A lays out the entertainment landscape and
shows how hybrid speech predominates in entertainment content
produced in many different media. Section B emphasizes that
advertising has made inroads in literature, where popular consensus is
unaware of advertisers’ presence.
A.

Sponsorship Plays an Important Role in the Economy

Commercially sponsored entertainment and information represent a
large and rapidly growing market.7 Branded entertainment alone
accounts for billions of dollars spent annually around the world. In 2009,
companies spent $6.25 billion globally on product placements, $3.61
billion of which was traceable to the United States.8
Embedded advertising has developed into a sophisticated aspect of
the artistic and business dimensions of entertainment content. As one
television executive put it: “‘It’s not just about sticking a Coke can on a
desk anymore,’ . . . . ‘It’s an evolving form.’”9 From the earliest days of
radio and television sponsorship—characterized by programming like
The Palmolive Hour—underwriting has grown into a reliable source of
revenue for programmers that serves as an ever-evolving, flexible
marketing tool for sponsors.10 Cooking shows such as Top Chef and
talent competition shows such as American Idol and The Apprentice
require contestants to interact with branded products for their challenges
and rewards. The Biggest Loser admonished weight-loss candidates to

6. See Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 795, 796–98 (2010).
7. Said, supra note 1, at 111.
8. Global Branded Entertainment Marketing Forecast 2010-2014, PQ MEDIA 11, 48 (June 29,
2010). An executive summary of the report is available at http://www.pqmedia.com/execsummary/
GBEM10-Executive-Summary.pdf. See also Said, supra note 1, at 113 (“Embedded advertising will
likely continue to grow as traditional models of advertising keep contracting.”) (citations omitted).
9. Brian Stelter, Low Ratings End Show and a Product Placement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/14/business/media/14adco.html.
10. See Ann K. Hagerty, Comment, Embedded Advertising: Your Rights in the Tivo Era, J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 146, 148 (2009).
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remain well-hydrated using a Brita water filter.11
The form is not limited to entertainment on television, of course:
embedded advertising exists in all audiovisual content, including films
and videogames (or so-called “advergames”);12 it exists in literature;13
and forms of embedded advertising arguably exist in many different
forms of editorial content, including broadcast news, online journalism
and blogging, government lobbying, and academic research.14
Embedded advertising has even permeated elementary schools.15 While
its existence in traditional media is commonplace, embedded advertising
especially thrives online, partly because one can efface or disguise the
origins of any given communication, and sources of influence may be
multiple, overlapping, and hidden.16
Indeed, for some time, hidden payments and secret provision of goods
to bloggers, for the purposes of securing favorable reviews, seemed to
fly under the regulatory radar. Marketers saw this period as a time
during which a great deal of experimentation could occur with
regulatory impunity.17 In that vein, online product reviews such as those
frequently posted and relied upon by visitors of Amazon.com, were once
susceptible to outright fraud. In one instance, a company was caught
paying people to write reviews of products, whether or not those
11. Alessandra Stanley, Commercials That You Can’t Zap, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/07/arts/television/07stan.html.
12. See Seth Grossman, Comment, Grand Theft Oreo: The Constitutionality of Advergame
Regulation, 115 YALE L.J. 227, 228 (2005) (describing advergames as having “become central to
advertising and marketing practices,” especially for food companies targeting young children).
13. See generally Zahr K. Said, Novels for Hire (Jan. 17, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Washington Law Review).
14. See, e.g., Amit Schejter, “Jacob’s Voice, Esau’s Hands”: Transparency as a First
Amendment Right in an Age of Deceit and Impersonation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1489, 1496 (2007);
Brian Blackstone, FCC to Probe Williams’s Deal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2005, at B3; Gardiner
Harris, Doctors’ Ties to Drug Makers Are Put on Close View, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/us/21drug.html?_r=2&th&emc=th&oref=slogin&;
Duff
Wilson, Harvard Medical School in Ethics Quandary, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/business/03medschool.html?pagewanted=all.
15. See ALEX MOLNAR ET AL., NAT’L EDUC. POLICY CTR, EFFECTIVELY EMBEDDED: SCHOOLS
AND THE MACHINERY OF MODERN MARKETING—THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON
SCHOOLHOUSE COMMERCIALIZING TRENDS 2–3 (2009–2010), available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/
files/CommTrends2010.pdf (enumerating seven categories of sponsor involvement in the academic
ecosystem).
16. See Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, Regulating Online Buzz Marketing: Untangling A
Web of Deceit, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 415, 415 (2010) (“Marketers have discovered that the Internet is an
excellent interactive medium to promote goods and services. Some marketers have begun to engage
in the flourishing business of ‘stealth marketing,’ a method of communicating with potential
customers in a way that disguises the originator of the communication.”).
17. Id. at 422–24.
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reviewers had used them.18 These paid reviewers were also instructed to
mark independent, negative reviews of the same product as
“unhelpful.”19 The FTC has since updated its Guides on Endorsements to
close the loophole that previously failed to address these types of
fraudulent or hidden practices.20 But the scope of the FTC guidelines is
not unlimited, and many forms of hidden influence may still be
permissible or actionable only if another, independent cause of action
exists. For example, users of the social media site Facebook recently
brought a class action lawsuit against that company for its secret and
unauthorized use of user profiles and activity in order to generate profits
for third-party advertisers.21
Taken together, these developments underscore that embedded
advertising, in one form or another, is still alive and well despite the
range of regulatory attempts to contain it.22 It offers a powerful means of
partnership between content creators and advertisers. Financial
assistance and the provision of props and services from sponsors can
greatly defray production costs for creators, while giving sponsors
valuable publicity in creative works, which offer advertisers access to a
context likely to be full of pleasurable or exciting associations for
consumers.23
Creators benefit from embedded advertising because it provides
financial assistance, often in the form of props and services that defray
production costs.24 Sponsors benefit because of the publicity it provides
in a cutting edge forum.25 Increasing use of celebrity endorsements, and
the rise of “brand ambassadors,” illustrate a shift in the approach to
marketing big brands. Sponsors, content creators, and even the stars
themselves are increasingly collaborating to put together a branded
18. See id. at 423 (discussing how Belkin, a computer product company, “was discovered to have
paid individuals to post reviews of Belkin products on Amazon.com.” The company instructed
individuals to post about the product as if they were using it.).
19. Id. at 423.
20. Id. at 431; see also Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. 53, 124–25 (Oct. 15, 2009).
21. See Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011). The parties in this case
have now settled. See Fraley ex rel. Duval v. Facebook, No. CV–11–01726 RS, 2012 WL 6013427
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (order approving settlement agreement); see also GCG, Inc., Fraley v. Facebook,
Inc.: Overview of the Proposed Settlement, FRALEYFACEBOOKSETTLEMENT.COM,
http://www.fraleyfacebooksettlement.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
22. See Said, supra note 1, at 134–40 (providing examples).
23. See Mark Litwak, When Products Become Stars, DEL. L., Winter 2005–2006, at 8, 10,
available at http://www.marklitwak.com/downloads/ProductsAsStars.pdf.
24. See id. at 9.
25. See id.

08 - Said Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

6/27/2013 12:06 PM

MANDATED DISCLOSURE IN LITERARY HYBRID SPEECH

427

message that highlights the stars’ creative vision for the brand.26 Rather
than simply endorsing a brand—say, by appearing on the cover of a
cereal box—these celebrity brand ambassadors may take on creative and
executive positions in advertising campaigns. These collaborations draw
on the “borrowed equity” of the celebrities, while allowing them to
shape the brand’s promotional strategy.27 As scholars and industry
experts have shown, branded entertainment is a vital practice with a
recent history of growth and projections of continued growth.28
B.

Sponsorship Exists in Literature

Knowledge that embedded advertising exists in audiovisual content is
widespread. Yet that common knowledge does not extend to the
embedded advertising that exists in literary texts. Nonetheless,
sponsored literature does exist,29 and it is likely to increase.30 This
increase deserves attention because responses to sponsored literature
have been almost uniformly negative.31 To summarize the gist of the
26. See Rupal Parekh & Natalie Zmuda, More Than a Pitchman: Stars Get Marketing Titles,
ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 11, 2013, at 8 (“Gone are the days when celebrities were simply paid to
endorse. Today they’re creative directors, music curators and ‘ambassadors.’”) (quoted from
magazine cover).
27. Id. (describing the “marketing-related roles” played by celebrities with respect to certain
brands, including Marc Jacobs (Diet Coke); Justin Timberlake (Bud Light Platinum); “Alicia Keys
(BlackBerry); Beyonce (Pepsi); Taylor Swift (Diet Coke); Lady Gaga (Polaroid); Gwen Stefani
(HP); Victoria Beckham (Land Rover); and Will.i.am (Intel)”).
28. Marc Graser, Product-Placement Spending Poised to Hit $4.25 Billion in ‘05, ADVERTISING
AGE, Apr. 4, 2005 (describing a nearly twenty percent rise in product placement spending each year
from 1999 to 2005).
29. Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood Turning Films into
Commercial Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 308 (1992).
30. Said, supra note 13, at 5, 15–22.
31. See, e.g., Richard Alan Nelson, The Bulgari Connection: A Novel Form of Product
Placement, in HANDBOOK OF PRODUCT PLACEMENT IN THE MASS MEDIA: NEW STRATEGIES IN
MARKETING THEORY, PRACTICE, TRENDS, AND ETHICS 203–12 (Mary-Lou Galician ed., 2004);
Paul
Collins,
Smoke
This
Book,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
2,
2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/02/books/review/Collins-t.html (stating that “[t]he practice had its
critics.”); Motoko Rich, In Books for Young, Two Views of Product Placement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/books/19cathy.html?_r=0 (referring to product
placement generally as a “widespread practice” and providing a specific example of literary product
placement that was subject to a firestorm of criticism for this marketing strategy); Gitangeli Sapra,
Ford Pays the Author to Make Its Car the Star, THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 29, 2004,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1455597/Ford-pays-the-author-to-make-its-car-thestar.html (discussing the head of a British writers’ union’s “serious reservations about the
practice”); David Usborne, Strange Tale of The Author, a Jeweler and Some Novel Product
Placement, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 4, 2001 (characterizing one view of Fay Weldon’s
collaboration with the Italian jeweler, Bulgari, as follows: “Ms [sic] Weldon has committed a sin so
terrible, so crass, so commercial, that she may be remembered now for betraying her art and
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critique, readers and commentators alike perceive such efforts as
unprecedented insertions by third-party commercial interests into artistic
works, where they do not belong. Such efforts are decried for their
sullying of the artistic purity of literature.32 Whether it is inaccurate or
naïve as a description, there is some intuitive heft to the notion that
literature is a realm in which embedded advertising is unworthy to tread.
The sanctity of the literary text—again, as an intuitive notion—
commands a certain power in the popular imagination. The power of the
act of reading, when imagined as a private, uniquely immersive and
autonomous action, generates a strong urge to protect the privacy and
dignity interests of the reader.
However, historically, literature has always been subject to
commercial constraints imposed from the outside by publishers,
distributors, and booksellers. Collaborations between sponsors and
authors are, therefore, not a completely new phenomenon or simply a
product of the current era of hyper-commercialism. Indeed, even the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries featured many instances of
serialized literature in which texts by advertisers and authors were
visually interwoven or juxtaposed. The late nineteenth century was a
time in which advertising techniques were increasing moving beyond
pamphlets or other traditional media to outdoor spaces, cultural texts,
and anywhere deemed likely to reach potential consumers. In this sense,
advertising broke new barriers and seemed, at least in the eyes of some,
to be newly ubiquitous. In her study of London and Paris in that era,
Sara Thornton describes what she believes to have been no less than “the
beginning of the commercial sponsorship of high culture,” even as she
documents the way that sponsorship was also jostling for consumers’
cognitive space by seeming to assault them from every possible location
in the urban landscape.33 Charles Dickens, for instance, serialized much
of his fiction in connection with sponsorship from advertisers, whose
texts were interspersed with those of Dickens.34
In the twentieth century, collaborations between sponsors and authors
were more episodic than constant. They may have taken the form of adsullying the literary tradition forever.”).
32. See Bill Fitzhugh, To Sell Out Takes a Lot of Bottle, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 6, 2000,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2000/nov/06/books.pressandpublishing (describing the critiques
the author received for placing a brand of liquor in his novel, in exchange for publicity and product
samples, which declared that he “had cheapened either literature in general, or the novel form in
particular”).
33. SARA THORNTON, ADVERTISING, SUBJECTIVITY AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY NOVEL:
DICKENS, BALZAC AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE WALLS 26 (2009).
34. Id. at 65–67.
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inserts into literary works,35 or they may have been works created at a
sponsor’s behest.36 A more familiar form of such work can be found in
the long-form review piece. Authors such as Hunter S. Thompson (Song
of The Sausage Creature),37 David Foster Wallace (A Supposedly Fun
Thing I’ll Never Do Again),38 Stephen King (Ur),39 and Alain de Botton
(A Week at The Airport: A Heathrow Diary)40 have accepted free trips or
products in exchange for writing about them.
Whatever the intermittent nature of such sponsor-author
collaborations in the past, however, different forms of advertising in
(and around) literature are likely to increase in the future.41 In the
aggregate, publishing industry changes, including the increasing
dominance of the e-book, and newly patented modes of inserting ads
35. It was not uncommon in the 1970s and 1980s for books to feature advertisements in their final
pages or in the middle of their bindings. For example, a popular romance series featured ads for
Clairol Hair coloring products (which referred to the novel’s characters), see FAYRENE PRESTON,
THE DELANEYS OF KILLAROO: SYDNEY, THE TEMPTRESS (1987), and Tony Morrison’s The Bluest
Eye (1970) featured tobacco advertisements that were inserted without Morrison’s knowledge, after
the text’s initial publication. See Collins, supra note 31.
36. For example, works of fiction are known to have been commissioned by many prominent
brands: BMW, Lexus, Heathrow Airport, Mini Cooper, Amazon, Electrolux, and Nescafé. BMW
commissioned four works of fiction to star its automobiles. See Jesse Willis, BMW Audiobooks
Releases A Twilight Zone-ish Product Placement Podcast, SFFAUDIO (May 26, 2006),
http://www.sffaudio.com/?p=447. The works and their authors are Don Winslow (Beautiful Ride),
James Flint (Master of the Storm), Simon Kernick (The Debt), and Karin Slaughter (Cold Cold
Heart). See Guardian Unlimited, BMW Audiobooks, CULTURE VENTURE BLOG (Mar. 9, 2006),
http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/culturevulture/archives/2006/03/09/bmw_audiobooks.html.
Lexus
commissioned In the Belly of the Beast. VARIOUS AUTHORS, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST (2008)
(on file with the Washington Law Review). Heathrow Airport commissioned A Week at the Airport:
A Heathrow Diary. See Paul Barker, Air Spray, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Dec. 4, 2009,
http://www.the-tls.co.uk/tls/reviews/politics_and_social_studies/article714913.ece (reviewing A
Week at the Airport: A Heathrow Diary by Alain de Botton). Mini Cooper commissioned Mission
Mini. See VAL MCDERMID, MISSION MINI (2002). Amazon, Inc. commissioned Stephen King to
write a story featuring the Amazon Kindle. See David Kaplan, Interview: Stephen King on Kindle:
‘This Device Will Not Replace Books,’ PAIDCONTENT (Feb. 9, 2009), available at
http://paidcontent.org/2009/02/09/419-interview-stephen-king-on-kindle-this-device-will-notreplace-books/ (describing in general terms the agreement formed with Amazon to write a story
featuring the Kindle). Eloctrolux commissioned author Alex Mattis to write a novel, in the hopes of
reaching young men. See ALEX MATTIS, MEN IN APRONS (2006). Nescafé commissioned Love Over
Gold. See SUSANNAH JAMES, LOVE OVER GOLD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF TV’S GREATEST
ROMANCE (2003).
37. Hunter S. Thompson, Song of the Sausage Creature, CYCLE WORLD 70 (Mar. 1995).
38. DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, A SUPPOSEDLY FUN THING I’LL NEVER DO AGAIN: ESSAYS AND
ARGUMENTS 256 (1997).
39. In 2009, Amazon commissioned Stephen King to produce a download-only novella to feature
the release of Amazon’s Kindle electronic reading device. See Kaplan, supra note 36.
40. ALAIN DE BOTTON, A WEEK AT THE AIRPORT: A HEATHROW DIARY (2009).
41. Adner & Vincent, supra note 4.
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into e-books, indicate an increasing use of advertising in selling both
books and devices.42
Little has been written about sponsored literature. As a result, the
practice scarcely has been chronicled, let alone systematically analyzed.
My research in this area has begun to create a record by presenting texts
drawn from an increasing number of works that feature literary
sponsorship, which we might call “literary branded entertainment.” Such
sponsored brand references are difficult to discover, but growing in
number, especially as publishers shift to digital or other multiplatform
models. Through my original research, I have found sponsorships in
women’s fiction, young girls’ fiction, children’s counting books,
cookbooks, travel literature, comic books, spy fiction, romance, awardwinning literature, and—rather bizarrely—in a book of
economic/political scholarship.43 Because of the likely continuation of
collaborations between sponsors and content producers, and the
continued exploitation of programming that benefits from sponsor
investment, the line between artistic and sponsored content is often, and
may remain, difficult to pinpoint.
Literature thus offers a viable realm within which to explore questions
about hidden sponsorship. In addition, sponsored literature is perhaps
more troubling than sponsorship in the audiovisual context because
consumer awareness is not as high and because the legislative and
executive branches have done nothing yet to regulate it. No disclosure
scheme reaches most instances of sponsored literature.44 Scholars have
debated whether product placement transforms expressive content into
commercial speech for the purposes of more easily regulating it, and
42. See id.; see also Amazon to Embed “Smart Ads” in Kindle E-Books, BOOK CHASE (July 25,
2009), available at http://bookchase.blogspot.com/2009/07/amazon-to-embed-smart-ads-in-kindlee.html; Yahoo Files E-Book Advert System Patent Applications, BBC.COM (Apr. 9, 2012), available
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-17657859; Jon Fingas, Microsoft Patents Contextual Ads
in E-Books, Whether We Like it or Not, ENGADGET (Aug. 12, 2012), available at
http://www.engadget.com/2012/08/07/microsoft-patents-contextual-ads-in-e-books/.
43. WILLIAM GREIDER, THE TROUBLE WITH MONEY: A PRESCRIPTION FOR AMERICA’S
FINANCIAL FEVER 1 (1989).
44. The exceptions are: (1) literature encountered in magazines and (2) literature published as a
blog. Magazines are subject to an antiquated statute that requires disclosure of advertising funds for
reasons that are not consumer-protection oriented, but have to do with preventing fraud on the
government. See, e.g., Newspaper Publicity Act of 1912, ch. 389, § 2, 37 Stat. 539, 554 (1912)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1734 (2006)); Richard Kielbowicz & Linda
Lawson, Unmasking Hidden Commercials in Broadcasting: Origins of the Sponsorship
Identification Regulations, 1927-1963, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 329, 334–35 (2004). In theory, if
literature were sponsored and published as a blog, such texts would be subject to the FTC’s
Endorsement Guidelines. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing FTC Endorsement
Guidelines).
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they have reached different conclusions.45 Some scholars have debated
whether regulating product placements can be authorized, and concluded
that it is unclear and will remain unclear until courts weigh in on
whether embedded advertising is commercial and whether, if so, it is
deceptive.46 I suspect that the absence of any legislative or regulatory
scheme at present is due to a lack of awareness. In other words, few are
aware of the growing volume of sponsored literature and the increasing
number of intersections between advertising and literature.47
As electronic publishing occupies a growing percentage of the overall
publishing market, it will become increasingly important to understand
the role advertisers play in supporting and sponsoring literature. They
have an impact on both the creation and the dissemination of expressive
content. A romantic, or simply undertheorized, conceptualization of
literary texts predominates, which imagines that such works arise free
from commercial constraints or collaboration. Nonetheless, it must take
into account the growing amount of traffic at the intersection of
advertising and literature in order to reflect reality.
For the purposes of this analysis, I break advertising into two
categories: that which readers can easily identify as advertising, and that
which is not easily identifiable. The first type consists of traditional
advertising and exists around text, like literary banner ads or inserts into
physical books. These inserts are somewhat notorious because they are
sometimes placed in books without authors’ knowledge, and have
prompted complaints when this has happened.48 Literary banner ads
appear in periodicals in print and online, in comic books, in serialized
versions of print literary texts, and most pertinently, in digital
publications. This form of promotional speech is recognizable to readers
as advertising that exists outside of and independently of the principal
text. Standard federal advertising law and state unfair and deceptive
trade practices laws apply to these advertisements just as they would if
the ads were in standard broadcast or periodical venues. The second
type, advertising that is not easily recognized as traditional advertising,
45. See Robert Adler, Here’s Smoking at You Kid: Has Tobacco Product Placement in the
Movies Really Stopped?, 60 MONT. L. REV. 243, 276–77 (1999) (summarizing the arguments for
and against treating product placements as commercial speech); Snyder, supra note 29, at 303
(concluding it is likely not commercial speech).
46. See, e.g., Rita Marie Cain, Embedded Advertising on Television: Disclosure, Deception, and
Free Speech Rights, 30 J. OF PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 226, 232–33 (2011).
47. See Rich, supra note 31.
48. See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 535 (W.D. Tex.
1980); Spock v. Pocket Books, Inc., 48 N.Y.S.2d 77, 77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); Collins, supra note
31.
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intermingles with the principal text in some fashion. It is either
embedded after the fact in a pre-existing text, like a “literary product
placement,” or it consists of a commissioned text whose very existence
is due to a sponsor who wishes to showcase his brand in long-form
creative “advertising prose.”49 I call this “sponsor-generated content.”50
This Article focuses on the second type, the kind of advertising that is
not necessarily recognized as such, like product placements and sponsorgenerated content. Finding that it is not deceptive under the FTC’s usual
standards, the Article asks whether it nonetheless harms consumers in a
way that, while not amounting to full-fledged deception, still deserves
attention from scholars and regulators. Consequently, the Article
suggests that “influence” is a form of harm that lies below deception’s
threshold, and inquires into whether and how the law might regulate it.
II. “WRITTEN LIKE AN ADVERTISEMENT”: ART IS NOT
NEUTRAL
This Part rebuts the dominant presumption in sponsorship and
endorsement law that advertising content can meaningfully be parsed
and differentiated from creative content. The presumption underlies
disclosure requirement regimes, which are designed as though artistic
content is neutral and treat any commercial influences on art as suspect
or non-neutral, and thus require disclosure. Put in its most reductive
form, such a presumption casts art as a priori reliable, trustworthy, and
uninterested in exerting directed influence over consumers. Conversely,
commerce is thought to be unreliable, untrustworthy, and tainted by a
desire to influence consumers for the purpose of directing their
purchasing decisions or otherwise affecting their behavior. When the
two intertwine, to whatever extent, in the creation of hybrid speech,
there are two questions of concern to consumer advocates and members
of creative guilds, who have been the most outspoken opponents of
embedded advertising and other forms of hybrid speech.51 First, do
artists freely choose to include sponsors’ brands and messages, or do
they do so based on coercion—as the Writers’ Guild represents about its

49. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Words From Our Sponsor: A Jeweler Commissions a Novel, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/03/business/media/03BOOK.html.
50. Said, supra note 13, at 29.
51. Their intense opposition led to their submission of the three main reform proposals offered to
the FCC in response to its Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. See Rita Marie
Cain, Embedded Advertising on Television: Classic Legal Environment and Business Law Content
“Brought to You by . . . ”, 27 J.L. STUD. EDUC. 209, 220–23 (2010).
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members—or perhaps financial incentive?52 Second, how much
influence did sponsors exert over the artwork in question? Current
disclosure regimes do not pose these questions directly. Instead, in their
formulation of the inquiry into sponsor involvement, regulators display
fidelity to the troubling presumption that art and commerce can be
meaningfully separated. This presumption frames art and commerce in
distinct and discrete terms that cast one as the good party and the other
as the corrupting party. Focusing on sponsored literature, this Part
concludes that hybrid speech cannot be neatly divided in that way, and it
questions the basis for such a semiotic division of labor. Section A
provides an example of the view that advertising can and must be
differentiated from non-advertising content because advertising is not
neutral, and non-advertising content is, or can be, neutral. This logic
underpins the flawed regulation of hybrid speech, and thus it is helpful
to identify it and revisit it. Section B provides examples of literary
hybrid speech and illustrates that in many instances, art and commerce
are inextricable.
A.

Advertising Is Considered Non-Neutral, Whereas Other Content Is
Neutral

In 2010, an internet search led me to a Wikipedia page with the
following warning: “This section appears to be written like an
advertisement. Please improve it by rewriting promotional content from
a neutral point of view . . . .”53 Wikipedia’s disclosure policy is reflective
of the general view that advertising should be disentangled from other
forms of content, treated as its own genre—having nothing to do with art
or editorial content—and labeled accordingly. Further investigation
revealed that one of Wikipedia’s three core content policies requires a
“neutral point of view” (NPOV), which, along with “verifiability” and a
policy of allowing “no original research,” are meant to ensure reliability

52. Press Release, Writers Guild of America, East and West, Are You SELLING to Me? 1 (Nov.
14, 2005) [hereinafter Writers Guild of America], available at http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/
news_and_events/press_release/2005/white_paper.pdf. For the writers represented in this complaint,
the sense is that they are bound by a contract to produce content for a program, but they were not
aware they would also have to write advertising copy as part of that artistic employment. Many feel
that adding promotional messages becomes an after-the-fact and objectionable condition of
continued employment.
53. Baker Street Irregulars, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baker_Street_Irregulars
(last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“This section appears to be written like an advertisement. Please
help improve it by rewriting promotional content from a neutral point of view and removing any
inappropriate external links. (January 2010)”).
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and legitimacy.54 Yet it seems an odd idea that these characteristics—
neutrality, verifiability, non-originality—would purportedly exist on one
side of a sociolinguistic, epistemological, or generic divide, on the other
side of which stand advertisements. For instance, in the legal realm,
advertising is held to particular standards only at the point at which it
starts making verifiable claims, suggesting that in some cases the two
(advertising and verifiability) can, and must, coexist.55 Still, Wikipedia
intended something specific through this disclosure language: it wanted
to put readers on notice that the kind of speech they will encounter
therein requires extra vigilance. It also implies that Wikipedia readers
cannot discover this epistemological uncertainty on their own. The
potentially suspect content was interwoven with the putatively reliable
or trustworthy content, thus requiring rewriting to conform to
Wikipedia’s neutrality policy.
So it goes with regulatory assumptions about hybrid speech. Hidden
influences—such as sponsors who embed advertising in expressive
content—are thought to shape expressive content in ways that remain
out of view to ordinary audiences and readers and that make that content
“non-neutral.” Regardless of which Wikipedia protocols might have
prompted one reader to flag this section—and other readers or editors to
leave it flagged for a year or more—what is perhaps most interesting
about this disclosure is the idea that epistemologically, some language
might be thought to communicate its non-neutrality, thus suggesting
inversely the possibility that “neutral” language exists elsewhere, in
some semiotic Shangri-La. This is one of the governing assumptions
underlying sponsorship disclosure law, which is challenged by hybrid
speech that resists neat categorization.
This Article’s focus is on exactly this kind of literary “hybrid speech,”
or “advertising prose.”56 The law struggles to reach, and then to regulate,
this kind of content. The regulation that does exist operates by
mandating disclosure of sponsorship or material connections in certain
contexts and under certain circumstances.

54. Wikipedia: Neutral Point of View,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Wikipedia:Neutral_point_of_view (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
55. An aside to the reader: this Wikipedia entry has not been rewritten yet as of February 2013,
and best as I can tell, that is because it does not differ appreciably in tone or content from the rest of
the allegedly non-offending sections of the wiki-entry.
56. I am adapting a term here that Fay Weldon used, perhaps half-jokingly, to describe her own
sponsored novel, The Bulgari Connection. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 49.
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Art Intermingles with Advertising

Consider the following few brief snippets of text. All but one are
drawn from literary works known to have been sponsored by the owners
of the mentioned brands.57 Beyond that structural similarity, they are
thematically linked in at least one way: they all display an uneasy piety
towards the pleasures of materialism, and they yoke some aspect of
character development or scene-setting to the aura of meanings
surrounding a brand. These passages exist because sponsors made deals
with authors to provide them with some benefit—goods, services,
publicity, or other financial reward—in exchange for featuring the
sponsors’ products.
Adam played with the stick shift, reflecting on the power at
his fingertips. The car’s V6 engine had two turbo chargers, 185
horsepower, and got up to sixty in under seven seconds. It was
by far his biggest toy, and he couldn’t get enough of it. His
Maserati Biturbo I made life bearable in L.A., even when the
crush of cars clogged the streets and avenues and freeways,
making any kind of travel a test of sheer determination and
strong nerves.58
“Got any scotch?” “Only the best.” Dan pulled out a
handcrafted wooden box with an etching of the Glenlivet
Distillery and its founding year prominently displayed on the
inside lid. He held it up as if it were a holy relic. “This is a
limited-edition collection of five vintage-dated single-malt
Scotch whiskies produced by the world-renowned Glenlivet
Distillery.” Carefully, almost religiously, Dan pulled the 1968
vintage from the box. “This is as good as it gets,” he said as he
uncorked the bottle . . . . Dan held the glass up to the light. “Say
Seagram’s and be sure.”59
I plod out after Alice and she hands me the brown carrier bag
while she shimmies into her shiny new Ford Fiesta, which I’m
dead jealous of. I slide in next to her and look at all the bells and
whistles and gadgets and I want a nice car again.60
I couldn’t find my favorite pair of black pants. They weren’t
at the cleaners and they weren’t in my apartment. It is so hard to
find a really good pair of black pants, and this pair made by
57. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 204; Fitzhugh, supra note 32; Sapra, supra note 31.
58. BETH ANN HERMAN, POWER CITY 11–12 (1998).
59. BILL FITZHUGH, CROSS DRESSING 38 (2000).
60. CAROLE MATTHEWS, THE SWEETEST TABOO 27 (2000).
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Theory was the best I ever had. I wore them all the time.61
All of these literary references to brands differ in an important way
from traditional advertising. Hybrid literary speech does not contain
within itself the obvious markers of its own commercial origins.
Whereas direct advertising historically has urged consumers to take an
action step, such as when it urges viewers to “talk to your doctor,”
“collect all three,” or “compare results,”62 embedded advertising simply
sets the stage for would-be consumers to develop positive feelings about
the brand in question. The appeal to consumers is often much more
subtle, sometimes barely noticeable. Because of this greater subtlety,
consumers are not on notice in the way that the marketing scholarship
assumes that they are when they encounter direct advertising. Their
guard is down. Indeed, this is perhaps the defining characteristic of
hybrid speech.
Hybrid speech, by definition, threads sponsors’ brands or promotional
messages through its artistic or expressive fabric. Because the sponsors
are not explicitly labeled as such, their influence is harder to identify,
and thus to resist. Indeed, the brands draw on their appealing
entertainment contexts for legitimacy and positive associations.63 It is
the hybrid, camouflaging nature of the speech that makes it at once so
appealing to sponsors and so potentially deceptive for audiences and
readers. As Siva K. Balasubramanian has written, hybrid speech
“creatively combine[s] key elements from the definitions of advertising
and publicity (i.e. they are paid for and do not identify the sponsor) such
that their respective advantages are consolidated, and their shortcomings
are avoided.”64 Professor Balasubramanian’s work is grounded in
marketing and businesses practices, and his approach reveals why
sponsors often view such marketing practices as a good strategy for their
brands.
Literary hybrid speech is no exception: per Professor

61. ALISON PACE, IF ANDY WARHOL HAD A GIRLFRIEND 5 (2005).
62. Paul Siegel, Product Placement and the Law, in HANDBOOK OF PRODUCT PLACEMENT IN THE
MASS MEDIA: NEW STRATEGIES IN MARKETING THEORY, PRACTICE, TRENDS, AND ETHICS 89
(Mary-Lou Galician ed., 2004); Letter from Robert Weissman, Managing Dir., Commercial Alert,
to Marlene H. Dortch, Office of the Sec’y, FCC (Sept. 22, 2008) (Response to Request for
Comments, Sponsorship Identification Rules) [hereinafter Commercial Alert Comments],
http://www.commercialalert.org/CA%20comments%20text%20only.pdf.
63. See Sponsorship Identification Rules & Embedded Advertising, 23 F.C.C.R. 10682, 10682–
83 (June 26, 2008) (“The purpose of embedded advertising, such as product placement and product
integration, is to draw on a program’s credibility in order to promote a commercial product by
weaving the product into the program.”).
64. See Balasubramanian, supra note 3, at 29–30.
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Balasubramanian’s definition, hybrid speech often is paid for and does
not identify its sponsor.65 Consequently, readers will be exposed to
brands in an artistic work that readers have sought out for pleasure, and
that readers will approach with their guard down, not mobilizing the
defensiveness and resistance that consumers use to minimize the
efficacy of advertising. Thus literary speech has the power to convey sub
rosa advertising messages to readers, in precisely the way that Congress
has deemed necessary to regulate in the broadcast arena.66 Yet because
literature is not broadcast, it does not trigger sponsorship disclosure law
under the Communications Act of 1934.67 Indeed, literary hybrid speech
does not fit into either of the regulatory schemes contemplated to
remedy deception as to the source of communicative content. FCC
sponsorship disclosure laws reach all content that is broadcast, whether
or not that content contains truth claims or advertising. Conversely, FTC
Endorsement Guidelines reach only advertising, not all content, but
apply in a broader range of contexts than sponsorship disclosure.68 Both
legal realms do not fit sponsored literature, which is neither broadcast on
television nor cable, nor clearly “advertising” in the sense contemplated
by the FTC’s endorsement guides.69 The FTC’s Guidelines target
commercial speech, and in general its jurisdiction is limited to regulating
advertising or other potentially unfair or deceptive trade practices.70
Because sponsored literature consists of hybrid speech that is at least
partly, if not primarily, expressive speech, it does not easily fall within
the FTC’s jurisdiction. The closest the FTC gets to regulating expressive
content that is not purely advertising is through its regulation of
infomercials, sponsored reviews, sponsored testimonials (for instance,

65. Id. at 30.
66. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2006); see also infra notes 119–122 and accompanying text.
67. 47 U.S.C. § 317.
68. FTC Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R.
§ 255.0–255.5 (2009) [hereinafter FTC Endorsement Guides]. The Guidelines offer numerous
examples to assist in interpreting the new rules, but most of them cover traditional advertising. A
few of them reach beyond traditional advertising to create liability for hidden endorsements made
on blogs (16 C.F.R.§ 255.1, Example 5, at 184); talk shows (16 C.F.R.§ 255.5, at 188); social media
websites (16 C.F.R. § 255.5, at 188).
69. See Cain, supra note 46, at 235 (“The FCC is only empowered by law to protect consumers’
needs for sponsorship disclosure. Similarly, the FTC is delegated the authority to regulate deceptive
advertising. Neither agency is authorized to address other social needs regarding commercialism in
the arts or the labor/management relationship among producers, actors, and writers.”).
70. Jon M. Garon, Beyond the First Amendment: Shaping the Contours of Commercial Speech in
Video Games, Virtual Worlds, and Social Media, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 607, 615 (2012) (“By their
express terms, the FTC Endorsement Guidelines apply only to commercial speech.”).
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on talk shows), and sponsored blog posts.71 But none of these are
primarily expressive, even if interwoven with some commercial
elements, in the same way as literary hybrid speech. The FTC could not
likely exercise authority to compel speech or otherwise regulate speech
that is non-commercial. Some have even suggested that the FTC’s
Endorsement Guidelines could be challenged on the basis that they do
regulate noncommercial speech.72
Thus literary hybrid speech falls outside the extant regulatory
schemes for controlling forms of hidden sponsorship. Yet both systems
contain an additional flaw in design beyond the aforementioned
limitations on medium and content. The two regulatory strategies at
work in the FCC and FTC arenas are arguably based on tracking
payments or transfers between sponsors and content creators, which I
call the “transfer model” view. This view presupposes that separate
parties exist and imagines artistic conditions that keep the parties
separate. In some cases, this transfer model view of sponsorship may be
accurate, but in many other cases, such a presumption fails to capture the
spectrum of possible forms and amounts of sponsor-artist collaboration.
Consider the cases in which a content creator added a brand into an
already-created work. For instance, the authors of Cathy’s Book, a novel
for young adults, changed the name of a mascara they featured in their
book from an unbranded name to Cover Girl. This occurred after Cover
Girl’s owner, Procter and Gamble, approached the authors and offered
their marketing support in exchange for the authors’ promotion of
Procter and Gamble’s mascara.73 This exchange exemplifies the transfer
model view of the way embedded advertising works. An artistic work is
created, and after its creation has occurred with little, if any, direct
interference from a sponsor, the sponsor offers, or the artist requests,
some form of consideration in exchange for the creator including the
sponsor’s brand or promotional message. Such a process makes
disclosure of sponsor involvement easy to identify, and thus, in theory,
to disclose. Similar examples exist, in which authors created a work, and
then agreed—or volunteered—to superimpose brand references onto the
work in exchange for some benefit, such as financial support, free
product, a venue for a book launch party, or a combination thereof.
Indeed, the examples discussed in the text at page 437 all represent such
71. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.
72. See Note, Internet Law—Advertising and Consumer Protection—FTC Extends Endorsement
and Testimonial Guides to Cover Bloggers—74 Fed. Reg. 53,124 (Oct. 15, 2009) (to be codified at
16 C.F.R. pt. 255), 123 HARV. L. REV. 1540, 1542, 1547 (2010).
73. See Rich, supra note 31.
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an exchange.74
The traditional transfer model, however, does not capture a, host of
other agreements that are becoming much more common. For example,
it fails to capture placements made in anticipation of benefit. It is
conceivable that for some artists, references to brands may be induced
by the knowledge that advertisers are likely to buy space in or around a
literary work if they like what they see and their brand is mentioned. Of
course, these incentives exist in any publishing context in which
advertiser support is desirable, from newspapers and magazines to works
of fiction, especially as e-readers transform the publishing landscape and
offer more viable opportunities for advertising alongside fiction.75
Formal sponsorship agreements need not motivate the placement of
brands in fiction because such authors may embed brands in order to
make it easy to convert their literary works into viable screenplays or
television scripts for which it then becomes easy to secure sponsors’
involvement.76 Alternatively, authors may seek sponsor involvement so
that sponsors will underwrite the costs of a launch party or publication
itself. In another instance, Bill Fitzhugh sought a publisher for his novel,
and finding none, inserted brand references to a popular brand of
74. In exchange for their references to the respective brands, Beth Ann Hermann received
$10,000 and a launch party at the Maserati dealership in Los Angeles; Allison Pace received a
launch party thrown at the Theory store in New York City; Bill Fitzhugh received marketing
support and free liquor from Seagram’s; and Carole Matthews received an undisclosed sum from
Ford for featuring its Fiesta in a prominent position in her novel. In all these cases, however, the
brand was not integral to the work, but added in after the fact and could have been removed with no
resulting loss in artistic meaning or depth. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 204–05; Jo Piazza, Prada
Placement, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 23, 2005, at 52, available at 2005 WLNR 25292883; Fitzhugh,
supra note 32 (claiming [though erroneously] that he “became the first novelist to use product
placement in a work of fiction”); Richard Simpson, Of Course I’m a Lifelong Ford Fan . . . It Runs
in the Family, THE TELEGRAPH, Mar. 13, 2004, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/motoring/2727242/
Of-course-Im-a-lifelong-Ford-fan-. . .-it-runs-in-the-family.html.
75. Said, supra note 13, at 20–21 (describing how the shift to digital publishing changes most of
the factors that made in-book advertising not viable for most advertisers, such as the former
inability to measure advertisement efficacy, which click-through data now corrects; the inability to
update ads once they were printed, which the e-book platform now offers; the long period between
the time of an ad campaign to the time of print publication, which the shift to digital publishing now
shortens; the inability to rotate ads, which allows different advertisers to “share” advertising space,
thus offering different pricing levels, which the e-book now enables, and so on).
76. For example, the novel Gossip Girl was filled with brand references that were unsponsored,
but became sponsored when the work was converted into a television program. See Rich, supra note
31 (noting the brand references that proliferate in Gossip Girl, unsponsored); Brian Steinberg,
Product Ads Gain More Screen Time:
Economics Spur TV Networks to Ease Placement Rules, BOS. GLOBE, July 28, 2009,
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2009/07/28/product_ads_gain_more_screen_time/
(describing heavily integrated and sponsored Vitamin Water brand references in the television
version).
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liquor.77 Armed with these product placements, which he inserted of his
own volition, Fitzhugh approached Seagram’s Liquors, and that brand
owner agreed to help him publish the novel by providing publicity and
financial support.78
Finally, the transfer-model of embedded advertising—which imagines
discrete, arms-length parties that converge after a work of art has been
conceived to consider promotional possibilities within it—excludes the
important category of sponsor-generated content. Sponsors increasingly
use long-form advertising, hiring artists to produce highly expressive
advertisements containing little in the way of direct factual statements.
Brand owners such as BMW, Lexus, Hilton, Bulgari, Diageo, and
Chanel, to name some of the most prominent brands, have all
participated in the sponsor-generated genre.79 London’s Heathrow
Airport commissioned a novella by well-known author Alain De
Botton.80 The popular brand of liquor, Captain Morgan’s Spiced Rum,
created a thirty-minute film that was shown at the Sundance Film
Festival and that purported to be a documentary about the real-life
exploits of the actual Henry Morgan, a swashbuckling privateer whose
identity lends the brand its name.81 In conjunction with the film,
alcoholic beverages company Diageo also commissioned a graphic novel
by the well-known artists Ben Templesmith and Michael Bendis, which
was to be released alongside the film.82 These brand owners have all
released some form of artwork—from novellas, short stories, and novels,
to short films.83
These examples suggest that art and commerce—or artists and
sponsors—are working in a range of ways that sponsorship disclosure
law did not, and still does not entirely, anticipate. When sponsor-artist
collaboration exists from the beginning, it is unclear whether
commercial control can be separated from artistic autonomy. Incentives
may align for both parties: artists want their work to be published or
broadcast; sponsors want their products to receive good publicity. Yet
these aligned incentives may obviate the need for the sorts of transfers
between parties on which the “transfer model” is premised. In turn, it
77. See Fitzhugh, supra note 32.
78. Id.
79. See Said, supra note 13, at 11–15.
80. Barker, supra note 36.
81. Marc Graser, Captain Morgan Seeks Sundance Spotlight, VARIETY, Jan. 16, 2013,
http://variety.com/2013/film/news/captain-morgan-seeks-sundance-spotlight-1118064705/.
82. Id.
83. See supra notes 31–40 and accompanying text.
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becomes harder for the law to track commercial control over art in the
way that the disclosure regime envisions. Art and commerce could be
said to be “commingling,” rather than remaining separate entities that
transfer goods, services, benefits, or airtime between them as part of
sponsorship deals. These collaborations raise a number of issues, which
will be explored in Parts IV and V, with respect to whether sponsorship
disclosure remains meaningful. They also demonstrate that art and
commerce commingle sufficiently that the categories “art” and
“commerce” are, at a minimum, destabilized, if not rendered useless.
These collaborations invite discussion as to whether certain sorts of
collaborations should be permitted to elude regulation. The FCC’s
regulation of hidden sponsorship, for example, exempts from mandatory
disclosure any instances in which props or services were exchanged for
airtime, so long as no payment occurred, and the use of the props in the
broadcast programming was “reasonably related” to the content of the
program.84 Any use of a sponsor’s goods or services that is considered
“beyond reasonably related” triggers disclosure requirements.
Recognizing that determining what is “reasonably related” would
present difficulties, the House Committee offered twenty-seven
illustrations to clarify the “reasonably related” proviso, and included
these in its Committee Report.85 The FCC then memorialized these
illustrations in its own rules, and added six more illustrations.86 Congress
provided several dozen illustrations designed to convey what it meant by
“reasonably related.”87
These illustrations reveal that Congress sought to facilitate
collaboration between sponsors and content creators because it
recognized that television shows that featured cars, refrigerators, and

84. The reasonably related exception was created by proviso when Congress in 1960 amended the
Communications Act of 1934. This proviso created a safe harbor for goods or services furnished to
broadcasters without a charge or at a nominal charge, in exchange for airtime. The statute provides:
“That ‘service or other valuable consideration’ shall not include any service or property furnished
without charge or at a nominal charge for use on, or in connection with, a broadcast unless it is so
furnished in consideration for an identification in a broadcast of any person, product, service,
trademark, or brand name beyond an identification which is reasonably related to the use of such
service or property on the broadcast.” Amendments to the Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L.
No. 86-752, § 8, 317(a)(1), 74 Stat. 889, 895 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (2000)) (emphasis
added).
85. See Said, supra note 1, at 128–29; Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 44, at 359.
86. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 28 Fed. Reg. 4732, 4734–35 (May 6, 1963)
(examples 28–36); Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 44, at 359; see also 4 THE ECONOMIC
REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATORY
AGENCIES 2373–546 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1973).
87. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 44, at 356–65.
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travel services were often very costly to produce, and sponsors were
more than willing to underwrite these expenses.88 Thus Congress
explicitly wanted to exempt certain sorts of collaboration but only up to
a point: after a use was no longer “reasonably related” to the underlying
content, mandatory disclosure requirements were triggered. The amount
of sponsorship is one way a program can go “beyond reasonably
related,” but the mode of such sponsorship matters, too: for instance, an
“unnecessary” close-up of a branded product can trigger disclosure
requirements.89 Some amount and some modes of sponsorship, subject to
the terms of the “reasonably related” exception, are acceptable and not
deemed, on balance, harmful enough to viewers to justify mandating
disclosure.
One might reasonably characterize this Congressional distinction
between “reasonably related” and “beyond reasonably related” as an
idealistic line-drawing exercise. It seeks to capture the point at which
sponsors exert so much control or influence over the content creation
that the content itself is no longer neutral, and becomes, in some sense,
harmful. On the other end of the spectrum, Congress also included
another important exemption from mandatory disclosure of hidden
sponsorship: the obviousness exception, which permits sponsorship to
remain undisclosed when its existence would be apparent (“obvious”) to
viewers.90 Traditional advertising, for instance, is obviously advertising
goods or services directly to viewers, even when it does so through
association and narrative suggestion rather than through direct
solicitation or direct factual statements. If the presentation of the
sponsorship is so clear that it is patently obvious to consumers, then the
obviousness exception waives the disclosure requirement.
These exceptions prove that Congress believed that consumers only
needed disclosures under certain circumstances. Thus Congress sought
to strike a balance through the use of substantive exceptions to their rule.
The attempt to carefully craft a limited scope for mandatory disclosure is
laudable. However, as others have argued, the effort is almost always in
vain.91 The balance Congress struck in this context imports numerous
88. See id. at 360–65.
89. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 28 Fed. Reg. 4732, 4734 (May 10, 1963)
(Illustration 24).
90. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(f) (2006). The obviousness exception exempts from disclosure
requirements any “broadcast matter advertising commercial products or services” that states “the
sponsor’s corporate or trade name, or the name of the sponsor’s product, when it is clear that the
mention of the name of the product constitutes a sponsorship identification.” Id. (emphasis added).
91. See Carl Schneider & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 647, 679, 684 (2011).

08 - Said Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

6/27/2013 12:06 PM

MANDATED DISCLOSURE IN LITERARY HYBRID SPEECH

443

assumptions about sponsor-creator collaboration and about consumer
aptitude and preferences. Yet sponsors and creators often collaborate
from the outset, including in the creation of sponsor-generated content.92
This type of ongoing collaboration allows sponsors and creators together
to infuse as many brand mentions into the plot as they like. This makes
such references “reasonably related” to the content and eviscerates the
sponsorship disclosure rule.
Indeed, the case of sponsor-generated content aligns the interests of
sponsors and creators to the point that the terminology ceases to be fully
accurate. Calling them partners in branded entertainment, though a much
more unwieldy phrase, would be more accurate than conceiving them as
separate entities that engage in mutual transfers for various benefits.
This type of collaboration, in fact, has been the case in “reality
television,” which routinely features activities, contests, and rewards
built around emphasizing brands.93 Under these artistic conditions, the
brands’ centrality easily complies with the “reasonably related”
standard, and the producers thus evade disclosure requirements. In this
type of programming, highlighting the brands is a central objective.
Regularly scripted programming has also seen an increase in the use
of “product integration,” or heavy integration of brands into television
programming content.94 Several recent episodes of programs that have
aired, including Modern Family and The Middle, appear to center on a
character’s desire to receive an iPad, for example, thus spawning
discussion by a television critic and other fans as to whether these
subplots were the result of sponsor-creator collaborations.95 Current
92. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
93. See Said, supra note 1, at 114–15; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text; KEMBREW
MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: RESISTANCE AND REPRESSION IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 189 (2007) (“Reality television turned out to be an incredibly important vehicle for
placement; indeed, Survivor producer Mark Burnett described his show as being ‘as much a
marketing vehicle as it is a television show. . . . My shows create an interest, and people will look at
[the brands], but the endgame here is selling products in stores—a car, deodorant, running shoes.
It’s the future of television.’”).
94. See generally Emily Nussbaum, What Would Tina Fey Do for a SoyJoy?, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 5,
2008, at 32 (offering examples of numerous product integrations); Neda Ulaby, Taking Product
Placement
Another
Step,
NPR.COM,
Sept.
22,
2008,
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94851729 (“When you see giant Coke cups
sitting at the fingertips of American Idol judges, that’s not just product placement. That’s fullfledged product integration—when a brand becomes inextricably identified with the content of a
show.”).
95. See Emily Nussbaum’s “tweet” on February 7: “Is this Ipad integration on The Middle? I love
this show, but this Brick-wants-an-Ipad plot is making me unbelievably uncomfortable.” Emily
Nussbaum,
TWITTER
(Feb.
7,
2013),
https://twitter.com/emilynussbaum/statuses/
299649562384166912; see also Dale Buss, ABC, NBC and IFC Push Boundaries of In-Show Brand
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content creation practices defy the logic of the sponsorship disclosure
regime, which rests on outdated assumptions about both content creation
and consumption.
Meanwhile, the obviousness exception also seems outdated. On one
hand, its purpose was to exempt traditional advertising. When
advertisers speak directly to consumers, the FCC assumes consumers are
aware that they are being pitched. Yet the obviousness exception’s
application is unclear when advertisers speak indirectly to consumers,
such as through product placements or integrations that occur in
entertainment content but that identify themselves as pitches. For
example, in the film Wayne’s World 2, the characters engage in such
protracted and hyperbolic praise for brands that the consumer quickly
catches on to the irony and realizes that the characters are mocking
product placement.96 Similarly, on 30 Rock, Tina Fey praises a Verizon
cell phone in a deadpan voice and then turns directly to the camera and
says, “Can we have our money now?” thus both mocking these
marketing practices and participating in them.97
The obviousness exception clearly implies some awareness of
consumer aptitude: how able are consumers to determine when
sponsorship is obvious? In the case of traditional advertising, the answer
is clear. In the case of embedded advertising, the answers are murkier.
On one hand, consumer knowledge generally reflects widespread
awareness of embedded advertising as a practice. On the other hand,
many consumers do not seem to know about individual instances of
hidden sponsorship. Complicating this issue, then, is the increased use of
satire or hyperbole to gesture, from within the content, to instances of
embedded advertising.98 Such gestures, like those of Wayne’s World 2
and 30 Rock, mock embedded advertising while benefiting from it.99
They raise the question: are they reasonably related to the underlying
content, and if not, do they go far enough beyond reasonably related to
become “obvious”?
If sponsorship disclosure law conceptualized both the consumer, and
the creative process, differently, it might regulate embedded advertising

Integration, BRANDCHANNEL (Feb. 8, 2013), available at http://www.brandchannel.com/
home/post/2013/02/08/Television-Placement-020813.aspx; Brian Steinberg, Why Apple Didn’t
Have to Pay to Play—Again, ADVERTISING AGE (Apr. 1, 2010), http://adage.com/article/media/
modern-family-ipad-abc-collect/143105.
96. See Katyal, supra note 6, at 795–96.
97. 30 Rock: Somebody to Love (NBC television broadcast Nov. 15, 2007).
98. See Said, supra note 1, at 110, 133.
99. See Katyal, supra note 6, at 795.
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in a different, perhaps more effective, fashion. It is thus imperative to
correct some of the misperceptions at the heart of the discussion of these
promotional practices. There is a key misperception concerning the
independence of art and commerce: that is, the persistent notion that art,
on its own, is neutral and reliable, and becomes worthy of suspicion only
once it becomes tainted by commerce—an outside influence. More work
is needed to unsettle these old ideas within legal scholarship and
regulation, as they have been thoroughly unsettled in critical theory
outside the legal world. As literary scholar Gail McDonald has argued in
the context of literary modernism, scholarship that has sought to
rehabilitate the clearly interconnected forces of art and commerce “has
been a persuasive corrective to the notion of the art object as
autonomous, transcendent, extraordinary.”100
Let me offer a closing image showing how branding literally seeps
into the body of a literary text and exemplifies McDonald’s claims of the
work of art as an object or sign embedded in—and embodied through—a
materialist system. The work is a comic book created in collaboration
with Coca Cola’s branded sports drink, Powerade. The work features a
celebrity endorsement from the then-sports star of the moment. A
message from LeBron James on the inside cover of the comic book
advises: “And while you read The King of Basketball, know too that
Powerade has been mixed into the very ink used to print this book.
Yeah, that’s right. I’m not kidding you. That’s how committed Powerade
is to making The King of Basketball a one-of-a-kind entertainment
experience. Read on!”101 In a very real sense, this comic book is made
up of branding: the commerce and the art are literally inextricable.
III. SPONSORSHIP LAW SHOULD MOVE ITS FOCUS FROM
DECEPTION TO INFLUENCE
Part III reviews the regulation of deception and explores why hybrid
speech fails to satisfy the legal threshold required for standard
misrepresentation claims that lies at the heart of deceptive advertising
law. This Part argues that, in fact, hidden sponsorship is not the same
sort of deception as are the misrepresentations targeted by deception law
more generally. Instead, embedded advertising’s potentially deceptive
effects can be divided into three different types of putative harm:
100. Gail McDonald, Product Placement: Literary Modernism and Crisco, 2(1) MODERNIST
CULTURES 21 (2006).
101. Gary Phillips, Damion Scott & Udon, KING JAMES: THE KING OF BASKETBALL 2 (D.C.
Comics 2004).
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deception as to the fact of sponsorship; deception as to the truth of the
sponsor’s claims, if any; and deception as to the influence of such
sponsorship. Different legal treatment attaches to the first two of the
three, and the third should be accurately characterized in its own class,
for legitimate consideration of whether it should remain out of
regulatory reach.
Thus this Part tackles the presumption that hidden sponsorship’s
concealment necessarily constitutes deception, and offers harm by
influence as a competing framework for the kind of impact experienced
by consumers exposed to such sponsorship. Consumers may be
influenced, even when they are not necessarily deceived, in legal terms.
Building off legal scholar Gregory Klass’s taxonomy of legal regulation
of deception, this Part concludes with a recommendation that an
influence-based framework be adopted in future discussions of
regulating hidden sponsorship.102 Section A provides the background on
the FTC’s deception law. Section B compares the principles
undergirding sponsorship regulation generally and discusses key
differences between the FCC and the FTC’s regulation of hidden
sponsorship. Section C shifts focus to an area that current sponsorship
laws do not reach: mere influence on consumers.
A.

Several Areas of Law Regulate Sponsorship and Deception

Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) empowers
the FTC to take action against deceptive or unfair actions or practices.103
Its emphasis on regulating deception means that the FTC plays an
important role in regulating false advertising.104 Historically, the FTC
has very rarely exercised its authority to pursue those engaged in unfair
methods of competition and instead has focused almost exclusively on
deceptive actions, statements, or practices.105 As a result, in order to
prompt FTC action, an advertisement must be deceptive.106 In addition

102. Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. L.J. 449
(2012).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
104. Other sources of false advertising laws include the Lanham Act, state unfair trade statutes
(sometimes known informally as the “little FTC” acts), and other industry-specific statutes such as,
for instance, those that govern the manufacture, marketing, and sale of pharmaceutical products. See
e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006); Lanham Trademark Act § 43(a),
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 1735 (West 2008).
105. See Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 349–50
(2008) (describing an ongoing era of regulatory restraint and reluctance to use the FTC’s unfairness
rulemaking authority).
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to being deceptive, the advertisement must concern a material fact.107
Finally, for the FTC to act, it must be able to show that it considers its
actions in the public interest, and the public interest must be “specific
and substantial.”108 The FTC does not require actual deception, which
would heighten the burden of proof by complainants—or impose a
higher threshold on the FTC itself. Instead, it requires deceptiveness: the
capacity to deceive whether or not deception actually occurs.109 This
difference can be traced to the FTC’s mission, which is prophylactic,
rather than punitive: by embracing the broader standard (deceptiveness),
the FTC can deter more future actions. In recent decades, the FTC has
moved away from a standard that protects the gullible, and implemented
a reasonableness requirement for consumer behavior.110 False
advertising is a strict liability violation, but it does have some
negligence-like concepts in the sense that it asks consumers to behave
reasonably in order to benefit from FTC protection.111
The FTC has also developed a more particularized line of consumer
protection law in the form of its Endorsement Guidelines, first
promulgated in 1980.112 Since that time, advertisers have had to disclose
material interests in connection with any endorsements they used in
promoting their brands.113 However, since 2008, when the Guidelines
106. Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984) (“Rather the concept [of deceptiveness]
provides the Commission with a flexible sliding scale upon which it can typically infer whether or
not a significant number of consumers could be deceived from its own examination of the conduct
at hand and surrounding circumstances.”).
107. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 386 (1965) (discussing that courts have
developed the general concept that action against deceptive advertising presupposes that the untruth
or deception is capable of affecting purchasing decisions); see also Am. Home Prods. Corp., 98
F.T.C. 136 (1981), aff’d, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982).
108. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929) (“To justify filing a complaint the public interest
must be specific and substantial.”).
109. See generally Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 391, 392; Am. Home Prods., 695 F.2d at
687; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967); Regina Corp. v. FTC,
322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 896 (9th Cir. 1960); Goodman v.
FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 604 (9th Cir. 1957).
110. See, e.g., Ivan L. Preston, Reasonable Consumer or Ignorant Consumer? How The FTC
Decides, 8 J. CONSUMER AFF. 131 (1974) (describing the evolution of the standard for the deceived
consumer’s behavior); FTC Policy Statement on Deception, Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110,
app. 174 (1984) (requiring for a finding of deceptiveness an act or omission that misled or was
likely to mislead a consumer, behaving reasonably).
111. Good faith is not a defense to an advertiser’s misrepresentations; intent to deceive is not
required. See Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC,
542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
112. FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 74 Fed.
Reg. 53,124 (proposed Oct. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 255)
113. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2006).
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were revised for the first time, the policy has been extended to new
media and social networking, and the FTC has created new sources of
liability.114
In spite of the revised Guidelines, which represent the FTC’s attempt
to address new, potentially deceptive forms of marketing, the FTC
remains wary with respect to taking action on hidden sponsorship.115 Just
because sponsorship is hidden, which may feel intuitively deceptive to
consumers, does not mean that the deception is material for consumers
in terms of affecting purchasing or viewing decisions. Indeed, this was
the FTC’s position as recently as 2005.116 In this fundamental way, then,
hidden sponsorship falls below the threshold required for regulation
under the FTC’s standard rules governing deception.117 So while it may
provoke outrage on an intuitive basis, the practice of embedded
advertising, in many cases, does not give rise to any cognizable legal
claims.118
Nonetheless, in a different context, Congress believed that certain
forms of hidden sponsorship were sufficiently deceptive that they
merited legislative correction. In the late 1950s, a series of radio and
television scandals involving “payola,” or secret payments by sponsors
in exchange for airtime or control over broadcast programming,
prompted legislative and regulatory review of the communications laws
then in force.119 Consequently, Congress enacted new, more finely
tailored sponsorship disclosure requirements with its 1960 Amendments
to the Communications Act of 1934.120 That disclosure scheme,
however, is limited in reach121 and flawed in design because it is based
on broadcast technology.122 This mandatory disclosure scheme does
114. Cf. FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 74
Fed. Reg. 53,124, 53,125 (“The Guides merely elucidate the Commission’s interpretation but do not
expand (or limit) its application to various forms of marketing.”) (emphasis added)).
115. See Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir. for Adver. Practices, FTC, to Gary Ruskin,
Exec. Dir., Commercial Alert (Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/
staff/050210productplacemen.pdf (differentiating between embedded advertising and false
advertising on the grounds that embedded advertising does not usually make claims that are
material, deceptive or injurious, and clarifying that the FTC would revisit the issue if embedded
advertisements were making material claims).
116. Id. at 3.
117. See Goodman, supra note 2, at 109.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 99.
120. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 44, at 369–70. These are discussed more fully supra
Part II.
121. See Said, supra note 1, at 133.
122. See Goodman, supra note 2, at 86.
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govern some television programming, but this legislation is out of date,
not medium-neutral, and poorly suited to today’s rapidly changing
consumer viewing habits.123 The relevant legislation excludes some
cable programming, does not apply to all feature films that are not
primarily destined for broadcast in theaters—due to politics rather than
policy or doctrine124—and contains great substantive exemptions that
threaten to eviscerate the rule given the way sponsors now participate in
program development.125
The FCC recognizes many of the law’s limitations, and announced an
intention to revise its regulations in the form of a Notice of Inquiry and a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 2008.126 Despite the acknowledged
flaws in today’s sponsorship disclosure regime, the FCC has taken no
action to follow through with reforms in the years since its 2008 calls for
reform proposals.127
B.

Regulatory Principles Vary by Agency

Two of the three major forms of deception that potentially emanate
from hidden sponsorship are thus already covered by distinct legal
regimes. First, if consumers could be deceived as to the fact of
sponsorship collaboration, FCC sponsorship disclosure law and FTC
endorsement guidelines may apply. These two agencies’ rules do not
reach all possible instances of sponsorship, and the FTC guidelines are
merely recommendations, thus lacking the full force of self-executing
law.128 Yet they are complemented by an array of state consumer
protection laws, or “little FTC” acts, that might, at least in theory,

123. See id.; see also Jennifer Fujawa, The FTC’s Sponsorship Identification Rules: Ineffective
Regulation of Embedded Advertising in Today’s Media Marketplace, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 549, 557–
59 n.128 (2012); Said, supra note 1, at 103, 118–22.
124. Amendment of Sections 3.119, 3.289, 3.654 and 3.789 of the Commission’s Rules, 34
F.C.C. 829, 841 (May 1, 1963) (“Feature Film Exemption Order”). The FCC waived sponsorship
disclosure requirements for feature films in 1963, but did so in response to lobbying from the film
industry. Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 44, at 366; cf. Cain, supra note 46, at 229. At least one
scholar has noted that the FCC’s jurisdiction over films that are not broadcast is questionable, given
that its authority is limited to broadcast media. See Jacob Strain, Finding a Place for Embedded
Advertising Without Eroding the First Amendment: An Analysis of the Blurring Line Between
Verisimilar Programming and Commercial Speech, 24 BYU J. PUB. LAW 167, 176 (2009).
125. Said, supra note 1, at 138.
126. Sponsorship Identification Rules and Embedded Advertising, 23 F.C.C.R. 10,682, 10,692
(2008).
127. Cain, supra note 46, at 226, 235.
128. FTC Endorsement Guides, supra note 68, at § 255.0(a) (“The Guides provide the basis for
voluntary compliance with the law by advertisers and endorsers.”).
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provide some protection for consumers who could satisfy the laws’ fairly
low thresholds for recovery. The key to recovery under this theory of
deception is that some sponsorship must have taken place but has either
been concealed from consumers or improperly disclosed.
Second, if consumers might plausibly be deceived by statements or
claims about brands featured by sponsors as embedded advertising in
artistic content, they will often be able to make out a false advertising
claim under state law—even if they lack standing under the Lanham
Act’s federal false advertising provisions.129 In other words, if a work of
art embeds promotional messages that make verifiable claims, then false
advertising law will cover those claims. After all, false advertising law
will apply to any advertising claims that are made in the context of
expressive speech, and its reach will be limited only insofar as
advertising cannot be recognized as such—that is, perhaps, when it is
embedded and not disclosed. Difficulties arise when the format is
unusual and the advertising unexpected: it is there that the concern
becomes something different from the standard false advertising
concern.130 Instead, then, what becomes a concern is independence as to
source of influence.131
Yet neither general realm of law—neither sponsorship and
endorsement law, which concerns the source of content, nor false
advertising law, which cares about the substance of the content—reaches
putative deception. This third kind of deception is deception as to the
extent of influence exerted on a consumer as a consequence of
embedded advertising.
By contrast, false advertising focuses on propositional claims:
statements that induce consumers to believe a factual claim of some
kind.132 At the core of the regulatory concern here is that statements that
can induce reliance by providing valuable information to consumers
must not be misrepresentations. The Restatement (Second) of Torts sets
out the first principle at a very high level of generality from which
129. Gerald P. Meyer, Standing Out: A Commonsense Approach to Standing for False
Advertising Suits Under Lanham Act Section 43(a), 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 295, 297–98 (2009)
(explaining the uncertainty behind the standing requirement for consumers wishing to sue under the
Lanham Act’s Section 43(a)).
130. Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must be Paid: Commercial Speech, User-Generated Ads, and
the Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 721 (2010) (“Conventional false advertising
law will attempt to follow ads wherever they go, no matter how unusual the format. But where ads
don’t necessarily look like ads, a different kind of consumer deception can be at issue: deception
about the independence of a source. . . .”).
131. Id.
132. Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 661 (1985).
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particularized advertising and consumer protection laws emerged. If a
speaker makes a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact or opinion so as to
induce another to act, or not to act, the speaker will face liability in the
common law of deception.133
As a practical matter, deception law’s inability to reach hidden
sponsorship at common law probably partially accounts for why
Congress implemented sponsorship disclosure law through the
Communications Act of 1934. It also helps explain why the FTC felt
pressured to revise, after nearly three decades, its endorsement law
guidelines—because the many new and controversial stealth marketing
practices being implemented in the social media marketplace were not
reachable through some clear alternative legal regime.134 Nonetheless,
the grounds and the means for targeting hidden sponsorship in a
meaningful way remain difficult to locate in deception law, especially
once applied to literary speech.
Indeed, the FTC does not think product placement is deceptive in a
legally cognizable sense, as is evidenced by its continued refusal to treat
it as a form of deception when it falls outside the parameters described
in the FTC’s Endorsement Guidelines.135 In 2005, the FTC reiterated its
decision to decline to regulate product placement, citing the lack of
evidence of any consumer injury. In short, the FTC has declined to do
anything at all about product placement, for now.136 The FTC left room
for regulating it, in the event embedded ads begin to make material
claims. For instance, if on the television program 30 Rock, the GEbranded Trivection Oven—featured as part of an episode’s product
integration—had falsely claimed to cook a turkey in eleven minutes
instead of twenty-two, it could trigger FTC suspicion.137 But this is only
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (“One who fraudulently makes a
misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to
refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss
caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”).
134. Fujawa, supra note 123, at 560–61 (“[I]n 2010 the FTC evidently believed that embedded
advertising online posed enough of a threat of unfair and deceptive practices to require new
regulatory control. . . .”).
135. See Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir. for Adver. Practices, FTC, to Gary Ruskin,
Exec. Dir., Commercial Alert (Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/
050210productplacemen.pdf (differentiating between product placements and false advertising, on
the grounds that so long as the former does not make claims that are material, deceptive or injurious,
it is distinguishable from the latter); see also FTC Endorsement Guides, supra note 68.
136. Sandra Lee, Product Placement in the United States: A Revolution in Need of Regulation, 26
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 203, 213 (2008).
137. For background discussion of this instance of product integration, see Said, supra note 1, at
134, 136–37.
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so long as it was the sort of false statement that reasonably induced or
could induce consumer reliance.
The FTC’s rejection of sponsorship as deception rests in large part on
the materiality requirement, which is built in to common law principles
of deception as well as federal false advertising law.138 At common law,
both with respect to contracts and torts actions, materiality played an
important gatekeeping function139: recovery for breach of contract under
the nondisclosure doctrine similarly requires that an undisclosed fact be
“material.”140 Thus to count influence through hidden sponsorship as a
form of deception is to eviscerate or circumscribe the requirement that
deception occur with respect to withholding the kind of information that
is material to consumers. The failure to satisfy deception’s materiality
requirement need not mean that consumers experience nothing that
could be legally cognizable when they encounter, without their
knowledge, hidden sponsorship. Hidden sponsorship simply raises issues
of a different sort.
C.

Sponsorship Disclosure Laws Target Concealed Influence

At its most successful, embedded advertising exerts influence over
audiences. Sometimes consumers do not notice embedded ads, but they
may be affected by them nonetheless. Psychological research bears this
out: a phenomenon known as the “mere exposure effect” has long been
known to exist.141 As it happens, the more consumers see brands, as a
general rule, the more they like them.142 Marketers are well aware of the
power of portraying brands in an entertaining panorama. They have long
known, and tracked, the way consumer behavior can be altered when
sponsors and content creators collaborate.143 The fact is that product

138. Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False
Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1344–45 (2012). Insofar as any of the so-called “little
FTC acts,” or state unfair competition and deceptive trade practices statutes do not require
materiality, they might reach such forms of sponsorship, but they reflect the exception rather than
the rule.
139. Klass, supra note 102, at 463.
140. Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in
Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 574–75 (2006).
141. Matthew Hugh Erdelyi & Diane M. Zizak, Beyond Gizmo Subliminality, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA: BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN ENTERTAINMENT AND
PERSUASION 39 (L.J. Shrum ed., 2004) (“When some neutral (often meaningless) stimulus is
repeatedly exposed to the subject, there is a tendency for this repeated stimulus to be preferred by
the subject and to be judged more emotionally pleasing.”).
142. Id.
143. See generally MARTIN LINDSTROM, BUY-OLOGY: TRUTH AND LIES ABOUT WHY WE BUY
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placement works. A famous example from the marketing literature is the
film E.T. Its producers’ collaboration with the makers of Reese’s Pieces
was a very significant one because it worked so well.144 The film
catapulted Reese’s Pieces from an obscure peanut-butter candy few had
sampled to a bestselling staple of the supermarket aisle in the twelve
months that followed the film’s release.145 The question for legal
regulators is how to conceptualize the influence the film exerted over
consumer behavior. Is it deception if, after being charmed by the alien’s
enjoyment of the little colored candies, audience members decide to try
the candy, and like it? Multiple other factors—price, context, marketing,
and so on—affect purchasing decisions. Thus, if some influence is a
factor, is it the material factor deception law cares about?
Gregory Klass has created a helpful taxonomy of regulatory responses
to different forms of deception in terms of three frameworks. His
organization of the multifaceted laws of deception is helpful in
rethinking how to classify—and remedy—the quasi-deception that
hidden sponsorship can create.
The first of Klass’s categories consists of interpretive laws, designed
to prevent speakers from making misrepresentations, and involving
interpretation of statements to test veracity, once statements are made.146
Klass thinks of this area of law as properly targeting what he refers to as
deceit. The second of these categories consists of purpose-based laws,
designed to target acts done with the wrong intent.147 Klass designates
these laws as targeting “concealment,” which he distinguishes from
misrepresentation deceit on the basis of proof of culpability, irrespective
of any statements made. In the first category, a speaker may accidentally
make a misrepresentation: the liability will hinge on interpreting the
statements made, not the state of mind of the speaker. In the second
category, regardless of how the statements or representations appear
when tested for veracity, the inquiry will focus on the speaker’s intent.
His statements may appear non-deceitful, either because they are
literally true (even if false by implication), or because he is careful not to
speak at all on subjects about which he knows he would have to make
outright misrepresentations. Yet in the second category, the speaker
purposefully wishes to withhold, or conceal, material information. The

(2010).
144. See Snyder, supra note 29, at 302, 304.
145. Id. at 302 n.5.
146. Klass, supra note 102, at 450.
147. Id.
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inquiry into falsity or truth would fail to capture what is wrong about the
bad actor’s behavior. Hence regulators turn to culpability to home in on
and remedy the proper wrong. Finally, Klass describes causal-predictive
laws, which he envisions as consumer protection laws that draw on
behavioral psychology and knowledge of consumer behavior to predict
the potentially deceptive impact of conduct or statements.148 These last
laws need not focus on interpreting the meaning or testing the truth of
the acts or statements made in the course of a purported deception, nor
do they need to investigate the purpose and intent of the actor or
speaker.149
Each of the three types has its regulatory strengths and weaknesses.
The first type, for instance, can be mobilized against statements that are
not explicitly false or suggest wrongful intent by speakers, but that
nonetheless are misleading in context or in terms of how consumers will
interpret them based on conversational norms.150 The second type
requires no falsity, nor any interpretive expertise by adjudicators, but
instead concerns itself with intent. If wrongful intent can be proven, this
type of law reaches concealment and nondisclosure more broadly.151 The
third type does not require wrongful intent or falsity (and the
concomitant interpretation to determine veracity or falsity). In that sense,
this third type is more flexible and capacious. This category of laws
target conduct and statements by focusing on their predicted impact on
consumers. It draws on folk psychology, empirical research, and insights
from cognitive psychology to make predictions about consumer
behavior, and to justify regulating conduct not necessarily reachable
under the interpretive or purpose-based standards.152 This category’s
drawbacks lie in its cost (empirical studies are expensive) and its lower
predictability.153 This relative unpredictability exists because empirical
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 459, 472.
151. Id. at 478.
152. Folk psychology refers to two distinct forms of psychology inquiry. The first is also known
as “commonsense psychology,” which “explains human behavior in terms of beliefs, desires,
intentions, expectations, preferences, hopes, fears, and so on. . . .” The second interprets these
“everyday explanations” and tries to fit these explanations into larger cultural frameworks and belief
systems. See Lynne Rudder Baker, Folk Psychology, in THE MIT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
COGNITIVE SCIENCES (MITECS) 319, 319 (Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil eds., 2001). Klass’s
article draws on the first understanding of folk psychology, namely, the “commonsense
psychology” view of human behavior.
153. Klass, supra note 102, at 480 (“Causal-predictive laws are different. They require an
intermediate legislative step in which cognitive theories or empirical results are applied to repeat
transaction elements . . . .”).
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and cognitive psychological studies sometimes deliver surprising
results.154 Folk psychology, too, can sometimes predict counterintuitive
human behavior.155 The first two types have the great benefit of being
simple and thus easier for parties to anticipate and abide by. The third is
more flexible but may be harder for parties to use to predict liability in
order to comport with the applicable laws.
As applied to the problem of embedded advertising’s capacity to
influence, if not to deceive, the three categories offer a helpful
intervention. The first two do not align sufficiently with hidden
sponsorship to make them candidates for adoption. The interpretive
regulatory approach to deception is already at work in standard
advertising law, and, as aforementioned, embedded advertising does not
usually make direct factual claims about brands.156 The purpose-based
model seems unlikely to extend to hidden sponsorship because it covers
behaviors that have a higher degree of intention and scienter. Sponsors
may be negligent in failing to disclose collaborations, but the purposebased laws require something more in the way of culpability.157
Sponsors rarely conspire to deceive: they merely wish to exert influence,
and can effectively do so by not trumpeting their involvement. Thus the
first two types do not help rethink hidden sponsorship’s impact.
However, the causal-predictive category of deception laws may offer
some guidance.
The use of a causal-predictive approach to the problem of hidden
sponsorship could mobilize empirical research and insights into human
behavior to test the extent to which such covert promotions actually
exert influence. If these practices truly exert no influence, then
regulators will be right to leave them alone. Regulators will effectively
be allowing sponsors to throw good money after bad, because to spend
money on sponsorship that does not yield a return on sponsors’
investment is wasteful. Regulators would thus be safe in the knowledge
that consumers may be irritated, but uninfluenced in terms of their
actions. This seems intuitively unlikely, however. The agencies that
regulate deception may have few existing resources in place to conduct
extensive research on these practices’ efficacy, but that is almost
certainly untrue for many if not most sponsors. Large corporate entities
that can afford systematic efforts at embedded advertising possess

154. Id. at 475–78.
155. Id.
156. Goodman, supra note 2, at 109.
157. Id.
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sophisticated marketing departments, often with in-house psychologists
who test the impact of the sponsor’s marketing claims and strategies.158
Data on sponsorship efficacy do exist because without information on
their return on investment, sponsors cannot usually justify continuing to
pursue a particular marketing strategy. But often that data, especially
when collected by in-house marketing teams, will not be made public
because it is not always in sponsors’ interests to make such information
available to either competitors or consumers. Recall that the consensus
in the psychological literature is that embedded advertising does in many
cases exert influence. Known as the “mere-exposure effect,” this
phenomenon proves that consumers are affected by visually observed
stimulae even when they don’t report noticing them, and they develop a
preference for the things to which they have been exposed.159
However, assuming that regulators can demonstrate that hidden
sponsorship does have an effect on consumers does not necessarily mean
that deception’s legal threshold has been cleared. Because of the
materiality requirement, deception may remain out of reach. Yet the
causal-predictive model might allow regulators to reframe hidden
sponsorship as a practice that nonetheless does have some impact on
consumers.
This legal category is expensive to design because it requires
collecting data, which could require commissioning studies or soliciting
the advice of experts. Yet the effort may be worth it if its costs can be
amortized across many similar transactions.160 Sponsorship already
affects many, many instances of broadcast programming and film, and it
is likely to make more and more incursions into literary texts as well. If
regulators could frame the issue of hidden sponsorship more precisely,
they could tailor a better-fitting remedy than disclosure. As discussed in
Part IV, disclosure does not necessarily work well when the harm in
question is influence rather than deception.
Ultimately, this Part has argued that that the presence of forms of
embedded advertising in expressive content constitutes a form of
influence over audiences, instead of being a form of legally cognizable
deception that ought to be classified and handled the same way that the
law treats traditional forms of deception. To the extent that it tracks
extant theories of deception, it fits into Klass’s causal-predictive model
of deception regulation, with the disclaimer that, again, what is
158. See KENNETH E. CLOW & KAREN E. JAMES, ESSENTIALS OF MARKETING RESEARCH:
PUTTING RESEARCH INTO PRACTICE 464 (2013).
159. Erdelyi & Zizak, supra note 141, at 39.
160. Klass, supra note 102, at 477.
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occurring is more aptly characterized as influence rather than deception.
Any mandatory disclosure regime that seeks to address hidden
sponsorship should rethink its theory of harm and, accordingly, its
capacity to cure that harm.
IV. DISCLOSURE IS A REGULATORY TOOL WITH
SIGNIFICANT LIMITATIONS
This Part questions whether disclosure is warranted in the context of
expressive content such as literary works, given that that the
entertainment context in which hidden sponsorship arises is almost
entirely free of information of the sort that would normally be deemed
material to consumer decisions. What to watch, whether to continue to
purchase sequels to a beloved first novel, and whether to subscribe to a
full season of programming, are all decisions of a different order that do
not affect life, limb, shelter, or financial security. This Part argues that
the world of entertainment deserves consideration apart from the rest of
the information-dense mandated disclosure areas, which are typically
replete with difficult decisions that consumers must make based on that
information. Where information is crucial to consumer decision-making,
mandating disclosure makes a certain sense. Think of disclosures that
are required when people buy a house, make certain investments, take a
prescription medication, or vote. In all these “informational arenas,”
disclosures are mandatory because regulators assume that the
information disclosed will be useful. Yet even in informational arenas
like these, consumers are bombarded with disclosures and information
that—empirically—they are unlikely to read, process, or appreciate.
In the entertainment arena, it is difficult to imagine that, as a
behavioral matter, consumers would wish for disclosures interrupting
their immersion in pleasurable content they have sought out in their
leisure time. Consumers seek out entertainment content typically as a
respite, to provide enjoyment and relief from the rest of their lives. Put
another way, if consumers ignore disclosures in contexts where the
disclosed information really matters, why should we expect them to
wish for or pay more attention to disclosed information in arenas that do
not clearly affect the material decisions they must make? Because
disclosures in entertainment content are even likelier to be ignored, this
Article argues that they are the wrong regulatory mechanism to use.
Beyond this important difference in the context for disclosure,
doctrinal reasons militate against mandating disclosure for hidden
sponsorship in the entertainment context, specifically for literary hybrid
speech. Among the doctrinal difficulties are that consumers do not
always notice all the embedded advertising they observe, which makes it
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tricky to claim that it played a material role in deceiving them and
inducing subsequent action.161 Even when they do notice embedded
advertising—perhaps especially when they notice it—it is unclear that
they act in reliance upon what they have observed. This undermines the
idea that the sponsorship (and its hidden origins) is, in any sense,
material under the traditional doctrinal understanding of that term.
Without satisfying the materiality threshold of deception, it is difficult—
absent some alternative theory, such as influence—to justify mandated
disclosure.162 In turn, without a strong justification for mandating
disclosure in the context of First Amendment protected speech, any such
mandate likely would not pass constitutional muster because of the need
for compelled speech to survive heightened review.163 Consequently,
due to the different context of the entertainment world and its pleasureproviding purpose for consumers, and due to doctrinal reasons having to
do with the absence of materiality and the probable lack of
constitutionality of any disclosure mandate, regulators should consider
an alternative regulatory mechanism for addressing hidden sponsorship.
A.

The World of Entertainment Is Unique for Regulatory Purposes

Disclosure has arisen as a flawed—perhaps failed—means of curing
or preventing deception with respect to material information that
consumers use in making choices.164 The theory behind disclosure is that
it provides valuable information to consumers so that they can make
informed decisions.165
In spite of the notion that mandated disclosures provide useful
information that cures information failures and assists in consumer
decision-making, disclosures in practice rarely deliver their promised
benefits. Carl Schneider and Omri Ben-Shahar have produced an
encyclopedic and insightful survey of disclosure’s multifaceted failures

161. Said, supra note 1, at 146 (“Embedded advertisements that consumers do not notice can
hardly be considered material to their purchasing decisions because to be material, by definition,
they must be capable of inducing the consumer’s reliance.”).
162. See supra Part III.
163. Cain, supra note 46, at 233 (“Without clarity regarding what the public does or does not
understand about the paid sponsorship of product placement and product integration, the Central
Hudson commercial speech analysis stalls. If there is no public misunderstanding of the paid nature
of these product appearances, the ‘substantial government interest’ in regulating sponsorship
disclosure vanishes. The constitutional analysis would end, and increased regulation would fail.”).
164. See generally Schneider & Ben-Shahar, supra note 91.
165. Sunita Sah, George Loewenstein & Daylian M. Cain, The Burden of Disclosure: Increased
Compliance with Distrusted Advice, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 289, 289 (2013).
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to accomplish its regulatory goals.166 They have compiled a dizzying
array of disclosure requirements that span all imaginable areas of law
and realms of human conduct, and they have shown how these
disclosures simply do not work.167 The failures that plague disclosure are
too varied and numerous to summarize here. However, key failures
include that disclosers do not always know what their duties require
them to disclose, nor how to make these disclosures. Furthermore,
consumers may be faced with so many disclosures that they are simply
overwhelmed. Schneider and Ben-Shahar term this the “accumulation
problem”: consumers are inundated by so many disclosures that they are
unable to sift through all the relevant information even if they wanted
to.168
These information-providing disclosures from the health, financial,
and professional industries are primarily the sort tackled more generally
by the disclosure efficacy literature.169 But disclosure requirements are
not as obviously justified when they attach to expressive content that is,
at least in theory, not information-providing. The main benefit of
disclosure, to provide valuable information for the purpose of improving
decision-making, does not clearly transfer to the expressive works
context. Two starkly different sorts of contexts exist: the informational
context, in which consumers might plausibly need and desire disclosed
information for the purposes of making their decisions, and the
entertainment context, in which consumers retreat from their
responsibilities to a large extent and seek pleasure and release from the
informational world. Transferred to the world of entertainment, the
original justifications for disclosure as to the source of hidden
sponsorship simply fail to cohere.
The entertainment world exists to provide the consumer with
enjoyment. Thus disclosures foisted on consumers, in however
benevolent a fashion, seem likely to burden consumers, rather than assist
them. The entertainment world is not about—or perhaps not supposed to
be about—exercising autonomy by navigating a series of choices based
166. Schneider & Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, at 650.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 689–90. The authors draw on empirical literature to show that consumers do not want
to sift through those volumes of disclosed information: chalk up another failure for mandated
disclosure.
169. Id. But cf. Eric Goldman, Stealth Risks of Regulating Stealth Marketing: A Comment on
Ellen Goodman’s Stealth Marking and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 11 (2006),
http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Goldman-85-TLRSA-11.pdf (raising concerns over
disclosure’s effectiveness in a broader realm); see generally, Craswell, supra note 140 (focusing on
the problems that arise when parties do not disclose valuable, or material, or “basic,” information).
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on material information on which a crucial element of well-being
depends, such as solvency, safety, health, and the like. To be sure,
entertainment in the twenty-first century requires some decision-making,
but it is a unique kind of decision-making. Consumers, more than ever,
face choices about how, when, and where to watch their chosen
content.170 Viewing content no longer involves gathering around the
family television set to watch the same program as the neighbors do, at
the same time.171 Reading literary texts, similarly, no longer just
involves reading a hardbound book out of the family’s collection of
leather-bound classics but can involve a wide array of devices and
modality. In other words, consumers already do make numerous choices
about how to access their content.172
Their modes of selecting what content to consume may involve
collecting recommendations, reading reviews, and responding to
suggestions from service providers like Netflix or Hulu. Would
disclosure of embedded advertising affect material decisions, such as
how and whether to consume certain content at all once it was known to
contain sponsorship? While this could be asked as an empirical question,
the answer is in many cases likely to be negative as a matter of common
sense. Mandated disclosure usually exists in areas where disclosed
information is material to some subsequent decision.173 In the
entertainment context, it is a stretch to find any sort of materiality at all.
Assuming that decisions about what and how to consume content
were deemed material, it is unclear whether disclosures would actually
affect consumer behavior. Merely providing disclosed information
appears to do little to induce disclosees to make better decisions in
general. Yet the very concept of mandating disclosure “is to give people
good information. If they do not take up the information and learn it
accurately, mandated disclosure fails.”174 There is nothing to suggest that
this would be less true in the entertainment context, where the
accumulation problem identified by Carl Schneider and Omri Ben-

170. Said, supra note 1, at 117–19.
171. Id. at 139.
172. Id. at 118 (describing the “venture consumer,” a contemporary consumer who seeks content
out dynamically and autonomously: “Along with greater autonomy over what she watches, the
venture consumer has a range of media platforms from which to view content. She micro-manages
her media consumption, plotting an individualistic trajectory in terms of where, when, what, and
how she consumes. An increasing number of à la carte pricing options means that consumers have
numerous small decisions to make about how to invest their capital in the form of their attention.”).
173. Sah et al., supra note 165, at 289–90.
174. Schneider & Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, at 720.
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Shahar would be even more acute.175 Merely channel surfing (or
browsing Netflix) would become an exercise in that “time-sapping and
soul-sucking” exercise of control that Schneider and Ben-Shahar
bemoan as disclosure’s pyrrhic victory. For if the information mandatory
disclosure conveys is theoretically valued, but becomes less valuable by
being delivered in an intrusive, excessive fashion, the net benefit to the
consumer may be greatly decreased, or nonexistent.176
In the entertainment context, it is not clear that consumers spend, or
wish to spend, the same amounts of time weighing their decisions as
they do in the informational contexts. Mandatory disclosure regimes
assume consumers want information so as “to make decisions
themselves and want to do so by gathering and evaluating information
about their choices.”177 Yet these assumptions fly in the face of
empirical evidence that shows that consumers often resist making
important decisions, and do not deploy valuable information that has
been disclosed to them, when they do broach decision-making.178 With
regards to the related area of trademark and false advertising claims, the
law expects consumers to do some amount of work, but it seeks to
calibrate that work to some extent by lowering “search costs,”
unburdening the imagination (to paraphrase Graeme Austin),179 and
filtering out false advertising from other marketing.180 Any mandatory
disclosure regime ought to be thinking about the extent to which it
wishes to deploy the consumer’s valuable cognitive resources further in
an effort to protect herself.
Consumers do not always notice embedded advertising. When they do
notice it, it may be a source of minor irritation. Its prominence may be
the result of conscious efforts by the content creators, who draw
attention to the embedded advertising so as to mock it gently even as
they participate in it. If consumers do notice the hidden sponsorship,
however, they will not necessarily always notice the disclosure that the
FCC and Congress have mandated. Often, disclosure language scrolls
across the screen rapidly, in small font, at the end of programming. Use
of a digital video recorder or other means of prerecording content may
175. Id.
176. Id. at 729 (“Control means constant choices, time-sapping and soul-sucking.”).
177. Id. at 727.
178. Id. at 727–28.
179. Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827,
890–95 (2004).
180. Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L.
REV. 67, 120, 137 (2012).
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mean end matter, such as disclosures and credits, is not included for
consumers to view even if they wanted to see it.181 The disclosure
skepticism literature, as exemplified by Schneider and Ben-Shahar’s
article, discusses the problems with disclosures provided to disclosees.
Yet it assumes that consumers, much of the time, receive disclosures,
because much of the article is dedicated to describing how
incomprehensible and onerous such disclosures are to most disclosees.182
It does not contemplate the scenario in which disclosures are fleeting
and scarcely noticeable, or, worse still from the regulator’s perspective,
the scenario in which disclosures are seen to be as annoying and
intrusive as the barely-noticed hidden ads themselves.
Schneider and Ben-Shahar offer a dystopic vision of a hypothetical
consumer burdened with disclosures, whom they name “Chris.”183 Chris
is, as they tell us, a saint.184 All day long, his everyday actions give rise
to disclosure requirements by those who deal with him, and all day long,
he dutifully reads the painfully abstruse and complex disclosure
language, struggling in vain to understand it. When he actually seeks
certain information, he is unable to find it. His imaginary day concludes
after a brief session of watching television, too tired to pick up the novel
on his bedside table.185
Now imagine, for present purposes that Chris, poor saintly soul that
he is, decided, after watching his football game, to watch another hour or
two of television, and then to retire to bed and read his novel, in spite of
his fatigue. His programs on network television all include different
forms of embedded advertising. If some of the proposed reforms under
contemplation by the FCC are adopted, Chris will encounter additional
disclosures tacked on to the end of his disclosure-filled day. That is, in
addition to the disclosure currently required under Section 317(a) of the
Communications Act of 1934, which requires disclosure but permits
broadcasters to identify a sponsor just once in the credits that roll at the
end of programming, Chris will see “concurrent disclosure” language
that airs simultaneously with the sponsorship itself. When a character
discusses the amazing value he gets from his Toyota, if that reference is
sponsored, Chris will be notified at that very moment by a pop-up
disclosure at the bottom of his screen or a “crawl” along the bottom of

181. Said, supra note 1, at 158.
182. Schneider & Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, at 711–24.
183. Id. at 705–09.
184. Id. at 709.
185. Id. at 708.
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the screen.186 Some of the sponsored programming may be preceded by
a disclaimer—both aural and visual—notifying Chris that some of the
content about to be viewed contains sponsorship.
Among the proposals the FCC received, collated, and considered
seriously enough to include in its Notice of Inquiry, are suggestions that
would require very detailed and specific compliance. For example,
disclosure requirements might mandate the size and color of the font of
disclosed language, the amount of time it should remain onscreen, and a
full identification of the corporate identity of the sponsor as well as a
statement of the conflicts of interest, if any, between sponsor and
broadcaster.187 The Writers’ Guild, which protested what its members
presented as the increasing amounts of advertising being demanded of
them as writers in the form of product integration, elaborated on this
conflicts-of-interest demand with an example.188 “HP” for HewlettPackard would be insufficient to identify the electronics manufacturer,
and if any corporate ties existed between Hewlett-Packard and the
program’s broadcaster, network parent, producer, or employees, those
should be disclosed as well.189 Thus Chris could also see fine print on his
screen, identifying Toyota’s role in sponsoring Modern Family,
announcing Toyota’s full corporate identity, and clarifying whether
ABC—on which the program airs—has any material connections with
Toyota’s parent company.
Chris scratches his head and squints at the screen, trying to
understand what import this new information holds, or should hold.
Even his novel, which he picks up, wearily, after his exercise in
televisual disclosure bombardment, bears a prominent disclosure on the
front cover (“WARNING: THIS BOOK CONTAINS SPONSORSHIP”)
as well as footnotes peppered throughout the work to disclose every
branded reference.190 Chris sighs and puts down his novel. He opens his
iPad and begins reading his favorite blog, which reviews automobiles.
One of the cars receives extra attention and unusually high ratings. The
review is marked with an asterisk. As a final exercise in self-flagellation

186. See Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Sponsorship Identification Rules
and Embedded Advertising, 23 F.C.C.R. 10682 (adopted June 13, 2008); R. Polk Wagner,
Comments on Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 17 17–18
(2006), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Wagner-85-TLRSA-17.pdf.
187. Cain, supra note 46, at 229–30.
188. Writers Guild of America, supra note 52.
189. Commercial Alert Comments, supra note 62, at 2; Sponsorship Identification Rules &
Embedded Advertising, 73 Fed. Reg. 43194-02, at 13 (proposed July 24, 2008).
190. These literary disclosures are hypothetical: no disclosure regime exists for literature.
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by disclosure, Chris clicks on the asterisk, which takes him to disclosure
language stating that this blog was indeed sponsored by the
manufacturer of the car, which gave the blogger use of a free car for
three months so that he could perform a more thorough review. Chris
finally lets sleep claim him, knowing—though no one has disclosed this
to him—that if he stays up too much later, he will be thoroughly
exhausted the next day.
The FCC’s intentions are to protect consumers from the harms of
hidden sponsorship and to discipline broadcasters and sponsors to
provide information that the FCC believes is in the public interest. The
FTC’s intentions are similarly unobjectionable in principle, laudable
even. Perhaps the disclosures they mandate for sponsored blogs are not
as overly intrusive as those the FCC has under consideration for
television programming. Yet the information of the sort the FCC reform
proposals have considered mandating seems to be a great deal more than
most consumers would want, and seems as though it would be delivered
in a way more intrusive than helpful. Moreover, both the FTC’s and the
FCC’s attempts to protect the beleaguered Chris (and others like him)
would seem to ignore basic information about consumer needs, abilities,
and preferences.
These agencies’ regulatory efforts call to mind Schneider and BenShahar’s insight that:
[I]n many areas . . . knowledge is not intrinsically valued.
People may want to know less, not more, and so they may find
information a burden, not a privilege. They may begrudge the
time and trouble it takes to learn and use the amount and kind of
information disclosures provide. They may dislike reading
contracts, manuals, warnings, notices, forms, charts, and
instructions, or burrowing through endless data.191
The hypothetical Chris pays attention to the many disclosures that
bombard him, but Schneider and Ben-Shahar’s survey of the empirical
research on consumer behavior shows that as a consequence of the
constant bombardment of disclosed information, most people, unlike the
heroic Chris, “strive to stem the waste of time and attention required to
sort through that information.”192 Consider that after Chris’s day of
bombardment with information about decisions that really do matter,
like those concerning his financial, emotional, and physical well-being,
he will now be bombarded with information about—and, importantly,

191. Schneider & Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, at 729.
192. Id.
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during—his source of respite from that world of responsibility and
constant decision-bombardment. Schneider and Ben-Shahar make the
observation that decision-making is a means, not an end: this is truer still
with any decisions that must be made with respect to entertainment.193
B.

Materiality and Constitutionality Present Doctrinal Hurdles

As described in Part II, a strong adherence to a belief in commercial
separability from art characterizes sponsorship and endorsement law.
Yet the distinction between the two categories seems tenuous at best:
artistic and commercial parties often collaborate in the creation of
content, suggesting that the categories are fluid and that it is difficult to
distinguish meaningfully between their roles in the production of the
final work of art. Nonetheless, the underlying idea here is one with a lot
of cultural and political currency: it is the belief that listeners can, and
should, know the sources and motives behind speech, in part to inoculate
themselves against the full force of its persuasiveness.194 Without being
accompanied by disclosures, hybrid speech can seem tainted or corrupt
because of its capacity to influence listeners. In some instances, the law
frames this anxiety as an entitlement, a “right to know,” or a
corresponding “duty to disclose” information.195 This principle is very
easy to explain in any context in which information flows from the
speech, and listeners will use that information as the basis to make
decisions. It is less easy to explain when the information might make no
difference, or little difference, in terms of consumer behavior.
Whatever the merits of disclosure in contexts in which information
may be material or instrumental to consumers, it is unclear that these
merits transfer to instances in which the information to be provided
through disclosure is not clearly material to consumer decision-making
under a traditional understanding of materiality.196 For instance, if
hidden sponsorship in a television program is disclosed, it may provide
information that consumers find interesting (if they even notice it). But

193. “[D]ecisions—especially the subsets of decisions that mandated disclosure seeks to
improve—are generally a means, not an end; a distraction, not a pleasure.” Schneider & BenShahar, supra note 91, at 728.
194. See Namita Bhatnagar, Lerzan Aksoy & Selin A. Malkoc, Embedding Brands Within Media
Content: The Impact of Message, Media, and Consumer Characteristics on Placement Efficacy, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA: BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN ENTERTAINMENT
AND PERSUASION 99 (L.J. Shrum ed., 2004).
195. See, e.g., Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,936 (Sept. 3,
1975); Cain, supra note 46, at 228; Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 44, at 333.
196. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 386 (1965).
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will it affect their viewing habits? Will they choose to abandon, say,
Friday Night Lights, once they’ve spotted that Applebee’s and Gatorade
“furnished valuable consideration,” and seek instead some other sports
drama?197 Will they enjoy the programming less, knowing of the sponsor
collaboration? Will they choose not to buy the brands associated with
the program—and if so, should it matter whether they originally
purchased those brands knowing that their association with the program
was the reason for doing so? All these questions are another way of
asking whether hidden influences in hybrid speech can be deemed
material to some subsequent decision, and if so, how? The question must
be answered before an effective disclosure rule, if any, can be created.
Finally, the difference in the contexts of sponsorship matters in
considering the proper remedy, to the extent that a legally cognizable
harm arises. Where Congress compels disclosure of sponsorship over the
air, it relies for its authority to so regulate on the well-settled proposition
that allocation of broadcast licenses to licensees grants the government
some control over licensees, allowing governmental enforcement of
rules to safeguard the public interest.198 Broadcast licensees comply with
such disclosure requirements as part of their bargain in securing a
license to broadcast.199
If Congress, or the FCC, wished to regulate authors of sponsored
literature, these institutions would face substantial First Amendment
hurdles.200 If the FTC wished to regulate authors of sponsored literature,
it would need to show that the practices it was targeting fell within its
mandate. To do that, it would need to be able to show that the practices
involved in creating and disseminating sponsored literature were unfair
or deceptive.
More generally, because literary sponsorship typically occurs in First
197. Under the “Lights”: Applebee’s Happy with Product Placement, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY (Feb. 7, 2007), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2007/02/
Issue-96/Sponsorships-Advertising-Marketing/Under-The-Lights-Applebees-Happy-With-ProductPlacement.aspx.
198. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969); Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note
44, at 335 (“In assigning licenses, the [Federal Radio Commission] and FCC conferred on private
broadcasters the right to exploit a valuable public resource—the electromagnetic spectrum—for
commercial purposes. Just as the disclosure requirement in postal law conditioned access to
privileged mail rates, its analogue in broadcast law conditioned private broadcasters’ use of the
public airwaves.”).
199. Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 394 (holding that regulation of broadcasters does not
violate the First Amendment because licensees are not owners of spectrum allocations, but
temporary trustees “given the privilege” of access to “scarce radio frequencies” for the benefit of the
“entire community”).
200. Cain, supra note 46, at 230–32.
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Amendment-protected works of art, the burden of justifying disclosure
(which entails compelling speech) is high. It must be clear that these
practices are sufficiently harmful to justify compelling speech, and that
doing so is sufficiently narrowly tailored to a legitimate end. If
disclosures prove to be ineffective against sponsorship, they will fail to
satisfy the First Amendment threshold. In sum, mandated disclosure, in
the context of hybrid speech, is unlikely to satisfy either the materiality
hurdle required for FTC and common law deception or the First
Amendment threshold required to regulate literary hybrid speech.201
V.

LITERARY HYBRID SPEECH MAY DEFY ALL THREE
PRESUMPTIONS

A brief excursus into the work of one author demonstrates the logical
strains placed on the three fundamental assumptions at the heart of
sponsorship disclosure law. Consider the example of a bestselling author
who was formerly the chief executive officer of a leading advertising
agency: James Patterson.202 A multimillion-dollar bestselling author, he
routinely has multiple books simultaneously on the relevant lists of topselling novels.203 A professor at Harvard Business School referred to
Patterson as a brand unto himself: “I’d never actually heard a product
speak . . . . It was like listening to a can of Coca-Cola describe how it
would like to be marketed.”204 Even Patterson’s willingness to co-author,
which he admits is how he manages to produce so many works so
quickly, betrays more than a whiff of this awareness of his own
brandedness: he charges his co-authors for the privilege of working with
him, the way one would license any other trademark.205
Patterson’s work provides ample evidence of literature that integrates
brands heavily, though it is unknown whether Patterson enters into
formal sponsorship arrangements. Assuming that his work is indeed
unsponsored, it would fall outside the extant sponsorship regimes. Yet
his constant brand integrations are worth looking at more closely. For
example, Chapter 19 of James Patterson’s bestselling novel Cross

201. Id. at 233; cf. Goodman, supra note 2, at 130–32.
202. Gaby Wood, The World’s No 1 Bestseller, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 4, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2009/apr/05/james-patterson-author-bestseller.
203. Christian DuChateau, James Patterson: The World’s Busiest Best-Selling Writer, CNN.COM,
Mar. 23, 2012,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/23/living/james-patterson-author-interview.
204. Wood, supra note 202.
205. Id.
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features a family excursion to the Mercedes dealership near protagonist
Alex Cross’s home:
Jannie and Damon ogled a silver CLK 500 Cabriolet
convertible, while Ali and I tested out the spacious front seat of
an R350. I was thinking family car—safety, beauty, resale value.
Intellect and emotion.206
Cross’s son, Ali, loves the car, and he and the Mercedes salesman
exchange words of praise:
“You have excellent taste in automobiles, buddy. This is a sixseater, and what seats they are. Look up at that glass roof. Must
be five feet or so.”
“Beautiful,” Ali repeated.
“Stretch out. Look at all this leg room, little man. This is an
automobile.”207
The car is not the only object of praise. Cross immediately tells us
that the salesman “had been at our side the whole time without being
pushy or unnecessarily obtrusive. I appreciated that. God bless
Mercedes.”208 The moment is soon cut short, however. Cross’s pager
calls him to duty, and he “groan[s] loud enough to draw stares” while
protesting to himself: “Not on Saturday! And not during car shopping.
Not while I was sitting in this beautiful Mercedes R350.”209 Shopping for
a Mercedes with his family provides Cross with respite from his stressful
and dangerous life on the job and unites the family in the shared
pleasures of fantasizing about consumption. Their collective fantasy is
grounded in utilitarian concerns, including thoughts of “value,” “resale
value,” “intellect,” and measurable interior space, but it derives its force
from the aesthetic realm, from the “beauty,” “emotion,” and even
thoughts of “God” the brand inspires.
Again, Patterson has never divulged any formal sponsorship of the
novel or his other works. However, he and his wife are known to own
several Mercedes cars.210 In fact, Patterson’s works possess patterns of
brand references that would suggest sponsorship or some form of benefit
derived, or anticipated, from brand mentions. He mentions many brands

206. JAMES PATTERSON, CROSS 62 (2006); see also Wood, supra note 202.
207. PATTERSON, supra note 206, at 62.
208. Id. at 62–63.
209. Id. at 63.
210. Jonathan Mahler, James Patterson, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/magazine/24patterson-t.html?pagewanted=all
Patterson’s and his wife’s “matching Mercedes sedans”).

24, 2010,
(describing

08 - Said Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

6/27/2013 12:06 PM

MANDATED DISCLOSURE IN LITERARY HYBRID SPEECH

469

often, but he returns to certain brands as triumphant symbols of heroism,
loyalty, and success. The other brands merely serve as background
props, or worse. A case in point: the Mercedes in the scene above is
presented explicitly as a major improvement over the beat-up Toyota
Corolla that the family has kept because of its sentimental value (it
belonged to Cross’s slain wife).211 Cross is quick to state of the Toyota:
“I didn’t think much of the vehicle. Not in terms of form or
function. . . .”212 His children give him bumper stickers mocking the car,
including one that reads: “ANSWER MY PRAYER, STEAL THIS CAR.”213
While the reference above “bless[es]” Mercedes, this reference seems
to transform Mercedes into the savior that will indirectly answer the
prayer for a better vehicle. The Mercedes brand provides an emblem of
Cross’s yearning for upward mobility. But conveying that aspiration
would not require Patterson to fill a chapter—one of the novel’s longest
at four pages—with fawning over the Mercedes brand. At least one
reader is on record as having considered the Mercedes dealership
excursion subplot to be a bizarre interruption.214 The breathless
descriptions of the car continue after Cross returns to buy the R350 and
opines that he “liked the vehicle’s zip and also the dual-dash zone
climate control, which would keep everybody happy, even Nana
Mama.”215
Whether or not Patterson has a formal sponsorship relationship with
Mercedes’ parent company, it is clear his relationship to the brand is
unique and over-determined. For example, he renamed one of his novels
Tick Tock, but its working title was originally Mercedes Blue, after the
“out-of-the-box midnight blue SL550 Mercedes convertible,” the “sleek

211. An objection to this point might be that a placement deal is unlikely to result in negative
references to competing brands, due to sponsors’ fears of ensuing litigation. But Cross’s beloved
wife did love her old Corolla, so arguably the text provides a kind of counterpoint to the brand’s
critique. PATTERSON, supra note 206, at 27. When Patterson’s use of objects becomes very negative
(as when a car is used to stash a corpse or run someone over, for instance), the brand is
conspicuously absent. Id. at 366 (“Sullivan had a three-year-old Winchester in the trunk of the
car . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at 377–78 (“Headlights shone suddenly—two blazing eyes aimed
right at us. A car was coming fast . . . . [It] was a dark-colored sedan”) (emphasis added). In fact
eight separate references to the car used in a climactic shoot-out that almost kills our hero avoid
branding the car, which is highly unusual given how freely car brands usually circulate in
Patterson’s work.
212. Id. at 61.
213. Id.
214. See David Thomas, New Product Placement: Best-Selling Novels, KICKINGTIRES: THE
BLOG FOR CAR BUYERS (Nov. 20, 2006), http://blogs.cars.com/kickingtires/2006/11/
patterson_merce.html.
215. PATTERSON, supra note 206, at 108.
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Merc [sic]” that “stopped on a dime” on the very first page of that
novel.216 When criticizing those who would refer to his home office—
and symbolically, therefore, his mode of artistic production—as a
“factory,” he replied: “If it is a factory, it’s a factory where everything is
hand-tooled. So it’s kind of a Mercedes factory or something.”217
Somewhat remarkably, Patterson associates his own creative process
with the German automaker manufacturing process, displaying a
pronounced level of identification with the brand.
Though my assertions about sponsorship here remain mere
speculations, it is worth noting that Patterson has become known for
using aggressive and unusual marketing practices in promoting his
works, which suggests some sort of sponsorship perhaps less arbitrary.218
In other words, exploring possible sponsorship deals would not seem so
out of character. Patterson was head of a major advertising agency prior
to becoming an author, which speaks to his skill at and faith in
marketing strategies.219 Indeed, his authorial brand and the corpus of his
works attest to his willingness to treat literature as a commodity that can
market and be marketed like any other.
Patterson’s brand integrations reveal the shaky foundations on which
the three operational assumptions of sponsorship and endorsement law
rest. Perhaps Patterson was paid for his integrations, perhaps he received
goods or services in exchange for them, or in some other way benefited
financially. Assuming any of the three of those occurred, then no
division of art and commerce is tenable. If the artist knows any such
216. JAMES PATTERSON, TICK TOCK 3 (2011). The next two pages feature discussion of the car’s
vanity plate (“SXY BST,” clarified in context by the chapter’s title, Sexy Beast), its “fine leather,”
“high-torque snarl,” “iconic three-pronged steering wheel,” and the “precise, symmetrical” motion
of the hardtop roof’s returning to cover the car, “a glorious harmony of moving parts.” Id. at 4–5.
217. John Berman & Ted Gerstein, James Patterson: Give Them What They Want, ABC
NEWS/NIGHTLINE (Mar. 13, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=4445592&page=1
(emphasis added).
218. See Mahler, supra note 210. Patterson pushed for aggressively advertising his novels on
television even though it was thought at the time that such marketing would cheapen or detract from
the work. He conceived of his audience in demographic terms, even going so far as to set a novel in
San Francisco when he learned that John Grisham’s legal thrillers outsold his works on the West
Coast. He developed a system of co-authorship akin to franchising and has used it to keep up a
frenetic publication schedule of as many as nine books per year. To remedy his sluggish sales in
Scandinavia, he partnered with a bestselling author from Sweden. In short, he has been received as a
kind of “marketing genius who has cynically maneuvered his way to best-sellerdom.” Id. Whether
that characterization is more uncharitable than accurate, it reflects Patterson’s continued
commitment to innovating the publishing industry’s marketing strategies. Given the commitment to
unprecedented marketing techniques, it hardly seems unlikely that sponsor collaborations could play
a part in the mix. Id.
219. Id.
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benefits will emanate from placing a brand in the artwork, the question
of artistic intent can no longer be freely investigated. Art and commerce
are, at a minimum, intertwined, and at most, interdependent.
Turning to the second assumption, we can reasonably query what
precisely is deceptive about these brand references. (They may be
annoying; they may or may not be influential, but recall that the standard
the law has to meet is deceptiveness.)220 Even if the brand references are
unsponsored, they are omnipresent in Patterson’s works. The reader
simply cannot help wonder why the brand references are so frequent and
so hyperbolic. One speculative reason might be anticipated future
benefits—such as purchase of Patterson’s literary properties to be
transformed into audiovisual works: many of his books are indeed now
films. Another reason, similarly speculative, might be the expectation
that brand managers for Mercedes will learn of Patterson’s positive
emphasis on the brand and decide to reward him with free vehicles or
other brand-related benefits.
But still another possibility exists. Perhaps Patterson is a genuine
brand evangelist, who simply loves the Mercedes brand and wishes to
draw on—even reinforce—its associations with luxury, quality, and
elitism. As it happens, Patterson does have other brands play important
roles in his fiction, and it would require more familiarity with
Patterson’s overall body of work than I have thus far been willing to
acquire, to study the range and frequency of brands mentioned, and to
track their qualitative use. But assume for the moment Patterson simply
adores the Mercedes brand. At what point does his individual passion
become something suspicion-raising for the purposes of sponsorship
disclosure law, and what sort of disclosure would be desirable, if any?
Should the determination of these brand references, for regulatory
treatment, hinge on whether Patterson, who sets out merely to evangelize
his brand, ends up receiving goods and services in exchange? Should
Patterson have to disclose the fact of owning stock in the brands he
praises? Should Patterson have to disclose his own brand evangelism if
his goal is simply to see more owners drive Mercedes cars because he
loves the brand? Or, more innocuous still, because he merely loves to
write about the thing he loves?
James Patterson’s work provides a rich example precisely because of
its combination of (1) many brand references, (2) absence of
acknowledged sponsorship, and (3) extrinsic evidence pointing toward a

220. Snyder, supra note 29, at 336–37 (calling product placements “downright obnoxious” but
calling for “more speech, not less”); see also supra Part III.
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high level of investment in the brand. Though it lacks formal indicia of
sponsorship, such as any disclosure, an author interview, or a press
release, there are reasons to consider this hybrid speech. The speech may
look the same as speech that includes brands purposely placed in it for
financial benefit or other consideration. Yet the motive behind placing
brands in fiction can be artistic—such as to convey verisimilitude or to
evoke a particular class or locale or era. The motive could also be purely
personal. Perhaps an author simply loves a given brand and wants to
sing its praises, for no other reason than the pleasure of evangelism.
Hybrid speech may include speech with brand references in it placed
there in anticipation of inducing financial benefits, such as free goods
and services or movie deals.
In the absence of affirmative information confirming a sponsorship
deal, perhaps concerns over sponsor influence should reach the cases in
which authors seek to curry favor with sponsors for future benefits. If
the goal is to bring to the surface all material influences, this strategy
would be effective, but if the goal is crafted that broadly in scope, what
limits its scrutiny in the case in which an author seeks to influence
readers, not because of an external benefit she anticipates, but because of
a preference for a particular brand or entity? If the influence is so subtle
a consumer just barely recognizes it, is there a principled difference
among the three cases described, namely:
(1) an author who receives an outright benefit for including brand
references in her work, with the goal (the sponsor’s goal) of
influencing consumers;
(2) an author who anticipates an outright benefit for including brand
references in her work, with the goal of appealing to sponsors for
the author’s own benefit, when the appeal to sponsors lies in the
sponsor’s goal of influencing consumers; and
(3) an author who receives no outright benefit for including brand
references in her work, but places brands based on personal
preferences unaffected by financial or professional
considerations, but does so without disclosing to consumers a
personal goal of influencing them?
Should the answer to this question depend on the status of the author?
Namely, for those who would conceptualize art as separate from
commerce, would the answer to the classification of the third possibility
depend on whether the author was an independent author, writing in a
fashion imagined to be free from external commercial constraints and
with little hope of profit or success in influencing others? Put another
way, would the answer change if the author, though purely personally
motivated, were in and of himself a publishing megalith, a brand unto
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himself?
The many questions this Part has raised seek to bring to light the
unexamined role played by consumer expectations of artistic autonomy.
Insofar as hidden sponsorship matters to consumers, perhaps it matters
because consumers believe that sponsorship coerces authors to include
brands or messages that they would otherwise exclude. Underpinning
this idea is the assumption that artists are, in the absence of such
sponsorship deals, autonomous creatures that make decisions of their
own volition. If this free-will theory of artistic creation is what justifies
consumer indignation at hidden sponsorship, then hidden sponsorship is
only one proxy for determining artistic autonomy, and a flawed proxy at
that. Sponsors might be more or less controlling of artists.221 Artists
might be more or less susceptible to influence, and they might consider
external influence to be more or less welcome.222 Whatever their
susceptibility, communicating the fact and extent of that influence would
be inherently problematic.223
Imagine if the status of hybrid speech, for purposes of mandating
disclosure, was determined based on whether an artist had to soul-search
to determine how much of the work originated from himself as opposed
to emanating from a sponsor partner. Such a standard would be
inherently unreliable in the ways that all such artistic statements are
suspect: statements of authorial intention, generally, are correctly viewed
with suspicion. Statements in a context like the hypothetical one would
be even more so, subject to this consequentialist framework: declare this
work a product of art, rather than commerce, evade disclosure or admit
sponsors played a role in the artistic creation, submit to the disclosure
mandate. Finally, any such statements would be problematic as a
function of the difficulty in determining responsibility when partners
jointly author a work. In the copyright context, the problem of joint
authorship has a long history of disputes showing that even when parties
agree to collaborate, it is all too easy to miscommunicate, misunderstand
the scope of one’s duties or influence, or behave strategically.224
221. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989).
222. The writers and actors who championed extensive reform of embedded advertising, in their
comments in response to the FCC’s request for comments, did not welcome sponsor participation.
See Writers Guild of America, supra note 52. But see Weldon, Fitzhugh, and the many other
authors mentioned in this article, who acceded to sponsor invitations to collaborate, or who actively
sought out such collaborations. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
223. Consider the intricate proposals demanded by the writers, indicating that mere disclosure of
a sponsor’s name during the end credits would be insufficient. See Writers Guild of America, supra
note 52. The detailed reform proposals are discussed in Cain, supra note 46, at 229–30.
224. See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 504 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he determination of
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The example offered by James Patterson’s work has highlighted realworld circumstances around an author not known to have committed to
formal sponsorship agreements, whose work nonetheless suggests
patterns of sponsorship that raise questions for the author’s readers. In
turn, this combination of factors allows us to reexamine the flaws in the
three central assumptions at which this Article has taken aim: the
neutrality of unsponsored art, the deceptive—rather than influential—
impact of hidden sponsorship, and the utility of disclosure in addressing
hidden sponsorship’s perceived harms. None of those assumptions
works in the context of the James Patterson example, where the absence
of known sponsorship does not end the inquiry, where the presence of
brand does not clearly suggest deception but could be at work so as to
exert influence, and where disclosure might not tell the whole story, or
might not matter if it did.
CONCLUSION: SPONSORSHIP LAW’S FUNDAMENTAL
ASSUMPTIONS SHOULD BE REVISITED
This Article has identified and questioned three fundamental
presumptions that underpin sponsorship and endorsement disclosure
law. On the basis of examples drawn from literary hybrid speech, the
Article has shown that these assumptions do not map onto current
realities of artistic production. It argues that these presumptions are
unjustified and should be revisited and perhaps abandoned. Further, it
advances the theory that sponsorship has the potential to influence
consumers more than it deceives them. The distinction between
influence and deception is descriptively and normatively valuable.
Accordingly, the Article calls for further investigation into an influencebased framework for evaluating the regulation of sponsorship and
endorsement. Finally, it proposes that disclosure, as a regulatory
mechanism, be revisited in light of the influence-framework.
Disclosure cannot capture the range of reasons for which artists refer to
brands. Moreover, because disclosure cannot undo the effects of
influence consumers voluntarily seek out—thus assuming certain risks
themselves—disclosure is not an effective solution to the perceived
problem of influences exerted by hidden sponsorship.
whether to recognize joint authorship in a particular case requires a sensitive accommodation of
competing demands advanced by at least two persons, both of whom have normally contributed in
some way to the creation of a work of value. Care must be taken to ensure that true collaborators in
the creative process are accorded the perquisites of co-authorship and to guard against the risk that a
sole author is denied exclusive authorship status simply because another person rendered some form
of assistance.”).

